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Early work on security-typed languages required that legal information flows be defined statically.
More recently, techniques have been introduced that relax these assumptions and allow policies
to change at run-time. For example, the Rx language uses a policy language based on RT, a trust
management framework for representing authorization policies. While Rx made significant strides
toward the goal of allowing policy updates in security-typed languages, in this paper we observe
that certain design choices of Rx violate the privacy and autonomy requirements of principals
in trust management systems, thus making decentralized control over information difficult. To
address these problems, we propose RTI, a new security-typed language. In addition to avoiding
prior pitfalls, RTI’s most distinguishing characteristic is that it supports fine-grained specification
of security for dynamic policy. We also provide a proof of noninterference for RTI.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: D.3.3 [Programming Languages]: Language Constructs and Features; F.3.1
[Theory of Computation]: Specifying and Verifying and Reasoning about programs
General Terms: Design, Languages, Security, Theory
1. INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, applications must operate on data that is subject to regulatory and corporate
requirements regarding confidentiality and integrity. From medical data to customer pro-
files, the exact ways in which the data can be used and modified depends on the stated
wishes of the client and the terms under which the data were collected. Even the client’s
decisions on how the data can be used may be sensitive and subject to data integrity con-
cerns and regulatory oversight. Furthermore, the wishes of the client may change over time,
requiring corresponding changes in the usage policy associated with the data. Operating-
system-based security can ensure that an application does not read high security data and
then write to low security channels. However, this granularity is too coarse for individual
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applications that must work with data having many different usage policies, such as sets of
medical records or customer profiles.
EXAMPLE 1 (MEDICAL RECORDS MANAGEMENT). A hospital patient Alice may
have a policy allowing only the doctors in the hospital and her adult daughter to view
her medical record. She may also prefer her stay in the hospital to be kept private. If Alice
wants a specialist from another hospital to look at her record, she should be able to specify
a new policy to this effect.
These applications typically process data belonging to several distinct individuals or
organizations with different privacy and authority requirements. Within limits posed by
legal requirements, individuals need to have autonomy in defining portions of policy that
control how their data is used. To accommodate decentralized control over information, we
also need to minimize the amount of coordination required between different individuals
or organizations as they work to define the policies. The individuals may also choose to
keep their information private and we need to provide flexible ways to define such policies.
EXAMPLE 2 (REQUIREMENTS FOR A POLICY MANAGER). Within certain limits im-
posed by regulations, Alice should be able to specify her own policies for how her data can
be used. She may choose to delegate to the hospital some authority to control who can view
and modify her data. For example, Alice can set up her policies so that when a new doctor
joins the hospital, Alice’s records can be shown to him without any change to her poli-
cies. However, Alice’s policy should be sufficiently well protected that a medical-supplies
manufacturer cannot view or modify her policy.
To program such an application, we need a way to effectively define and enforce such
policies in the program. Trust management frameworks provide a way to define poli-
cies and credentials for distributed authorization, and are a good candidate for defining the
policies for applications such as those mentioned above. Language-based security research
seeks to provide flexible and efficient methods to automatically enforce fine-grained confi-
dentiality and integrity policies during program execution. For the past decade, researchers
in this area have worked on the problems of how to specify a desired policy in a program-
ming language, how to enforce the policy efficiently and, more recently, how to deal with
changes in policy.
Security-typed languages have been one of the most active branches of language-based
security research over the last decade. In this approach, the data types of program variables
are annotated with security labels, and a lattice label ordering is used to specify the legal
information flows among labeled variables. The type-checking rules verify that informa-
tion flow in the program adheres to the label ordering and type-checking thereby enforces
the security policy. If the program type-checks with respect to a policy, it does not have
illegal information flows. This enforces very fine-grained (variable-level) information flow
control.
While early work in this area required that legal information flows be defined quite stat-
ically, in recent years new techniques have relaxed these assumptions, enabling policies to
change [Broberg and Sands 2006; Hicks et al. 2005; Swamy et al. 2006; Tse and Zdancewic
2004; Zheng and Myers 2004]. Two of these works introduced techniques whereby the in-
terpretation of the information flow policies depends on the principals interacting with the
system [Tse and Zdancewic 2004; Zheng and Myers 2004]. Two others introduced meth-
ods for updating the policies that define legal information flows within the program [Hicks
et al. 2005; Swamy et al. 2006]. One of the most recent works, Rx [Swamy et al. 2006],
used a policy language based on RT, a trust management framework for representing au-
thorization policies [Li et al. 2002]. Although Rx makes several important innovations, as
we shall see, its design makes several mistakes with respect to subtle, but essential aspects
of the integration of security-typed languages and trust management.
In Rx, the security type of a variable x is given by two RT roles, one that specifies
x’s confidentiality policy (i.e., who can read the value of x), and one for x’s integrity
policy (i.e., who trusts the integrity of the value of x). A program’s security policy is a set
of RT policy statements. Rx employs static type-checking rules and also novel dynamic
semantics. At run-time, the executing program has access to a set of policy statements.
These statements form the dynamic policy and can be used to determine the control flow of
the program. Rx also includes constructs to add and delete policy statements dynamically
during program execution. The policy changes affect the semantics of a role and therefore
change the ways in which program variables can legally be used. In a sense, using roles as
the basis of security labels introduces a level of indirection that enables policy changes to
change program behavior without modifying the program. While there are several security
policy models that are based on roles, notably RBAC [Sandhu et al. 1996], control over
policy definition in these models is usually highly centralized, which is contrary to our
design goals.
EXAMPLE 3 (RX POLICY UPDATES). Suppose that Alice wants specialist Bob from
another hospital to view her record. In an Rx program, she can add the new statement
Alice.record ← Bob on the fly. If Bob specializes in a disease that Alice does not want
everyone to know that she has, then Alice will want to keep this policy statement private.
(Though, of course, if it is to have any effect, the policy statement cannot be kept private
from Bob.)
The previous example shows that security policies themselves can potentially become
inappropriate conduits of information. To avoid this problem, Rx gives roles the same
kinds of protection as provided for program variables, in the form of a pair of metapolicies
(C(ρ), I(ρ)) associated with each role ρ. Confidentiality policy C(ρ) identifies principals
authorized to know the members of ρ, and integrity policy I(ρ) identifies principals that
trust that the membership of ρ is defined correctly. The latter is significant principally
when values given to output channels1 depend on how that membership is defined. In that
case, everyone that trusts the data integrity of the value of the output channel has to trust
the way the membership of ρ is defined. As explained in section 8, this would mean that
Rx allows inappropriate principals to influence the definitions of roles.
Also, in the kinds of applications trust management is intended for, the choice of roles
as the unit that is protected has undesirable ramifications owing simply to the coarseness
the unit. For example, every member of an Rx role is entitled to learn who all the other
members of that role are. In the real world, role membership is often sensitive. But in Rx,
not only is every role member authorized to know that one is in the role, but also, because
of information-flow requirements, to know why one is in the role. If one gets a certain
service because one is HIV positive, one probably does not want everyone else authorized
for the service to know this.
1We use the term output channel to refer to observable effects of program execution, such as changes to variable
values or the security policy.
To address these problems, we propose RTI, a new security-typed language that builds
on Rx’s approach to the use of RT roles as security types, while addressing the privacy
and autonomy concerns of individual principals2. RTI uses role-based labels in programs,
and uses trust management principles to allow policy creators to control who can access
and update each individual policy statement. A principal needs to be authorized to know
the existence of policy statements that prove his membership in each of his roles; he does
not need to know the other members in the role. RTI also introduces language constructs
for querying and modifying policy statements that are persistent run-time values protected
according to security labels that are themselves run-time values. These constructs are
designed to control information flow via these policy statements in a manner that interacts
cleanly with the rest of the language constructs, in which information flow is controlled by
purely static means. The main contributions of this paper are:
—We observe that privacy of role membership and autonomy over defining ones own pol-
icy are important requirements for flexible policy management in a decentralized envi-
ronment.
—We present the RTI programming language, which embodies design choices that satisfy
these requirements.
—RTI introduces language constructs that are designed to control information flow via
policy statements that are persistent run-time values and that are protected according to
security labels that are themselves run-time values.
—We present a noninterference theorem for RTI.
—We present a comprehensive study of the design choices in Rx and identify their short-
comings with respect to the above requirements.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews RT. Section 3 presents
the key design features of RTI that distinguish it from prior work. Section 4 introduces the
RTI language. Section 5 presents recommended idioms for uniformly specifying labels for
policy statements and variables. Section 6 gives an example program written in RTI that
illustrates how the dynamic policy can be changed in RTI and how doing so affects the
program execution. The example is used to illustrate the static and dynamic semantics, as
well as the recommended security-label idiom. Section 7 presents the RTI noninterference
theorem. Section 8 describes the problems with Rx and how RTI resolves them. Section 9
describes related work. We conclude in section 10. Our noninterference theorem and proof
follow that of Rx and therefore we omit that from the main paper due to lack of space.
2. BACKGROUND: RT OVERVIEW
RT is a family of languages [Li et al. 2002; Li and Mitchell 2003] whose simplest member
has been called RT[ ] because it contains no optional features (which, if they existed, would
be listed between the brackets) [Li et al. 2005]. The basic constructs in RT are principals
and role names. We use A, B, D, and P , often with subscripts, to denote principals and
r, u, and w to denote role names. A role is given by a principal followed by a role name,
separated by a dot, e.g., A.r and B.r1; we use ρ to denote roles. A role defines a set
of principals that are its members. Each principal A has the sole authority to designate
the members of each role of the form A.r, which it does by signing policy statements.
2RTI stands for Role-based Trust management for Information flow.
Each statement has the form A.r← e, in which e is a principal or a role. We read “←” as
“includes”, and say the policy statement defines A.r.
— Simple Membership: A.r←D
This statement means that A asserts that D is a member of A’s r role.
— Simple Inclusion: A.r←B.r1
This statement means that A asserts that its r role includes (all members of) B’s r1 role.
This represents a delegation from A to B, as B may add principals to become members
of the role A.r by issuing statements defining B.r1.
A policy pi is a set of policy statements. The semantics of roles is given by translating the
statements in pi into a set SP(pi) of definite Horn clauses that obey the Datalog restrictions
shown below. We use x, y, and z to denote Datalog variables, which in this case range over
principals.
For each A.r←D in pi, add to SP(pi)
m(A, r,D) (m1)
For each A.r←B.r1 in pi, add to SP(pi)
m(A, r, x) :− m(B, r1, x) (m2)
The semantics of a Datalog program such as SP(pi) can be defined through several equiv-
alent approaches. Viewing SP(pi) as a set of first-order sentences, we write SP(pi) |=
m(A, r,D) when m(A, r,D) is logically entailed by SP(pi)3. Given a policy pi, the se-
mantics of a role A.r is given by [[A.r]]SP(pi) = {x | SP(pi) |= m(A, r, x)}.
3. RTI DESIGN CHOICES
In this section we motivate the manner in which RT[ ] is incorporated into RTI by appealing
to established trust-management principles.
Role owners should have autonomy. A readers-oriented view of integrity says that “if
the assignment x := y is to be allowed, every principal who trusts the integrity of the value
of x must also trust the integrity of y”. A writers-oriented view says that “every principal
that is trusted to define the value of y must also be trusted to define the value of x.” In most
contexts, a readers-oriented view of integrity is essentially interchangeable with a writers-
oriented view, which says that everyone who is allowed to define the value of y must also
be allowed to define the value of x [Li et al. 2003; Tse and Zdancewic 2004]. However
when RT roles are used to define these sets of principals, the readers-oriented view, used in
prior work in the area [Swamy et al. 2006], runs counter to the need that control over the
use of information be retained by the information’s owner. We illustrate this conflict with
the following example.
EXAMPLE 4 (READERS-ORIENTED INTEGRITY). Alice should allow the doctors at
her hospital to write entries in her medical record. Assume the integrity labels of the
updated record y and Alice’s permanent record x are Hospital.doctor and Alice.record,
respectively. If the assignment x := y is to be allowed, then every member of Hospi-
tal.doctor must also be a member of Alice.record. This is achieved in RT[ ] if the policy
includes the statement Hospital.doctor← Alice.record. Because the role in the head of this
3I.e., all models of SP(pi) are models ofm(A, r,D). Note that for atomic formulas L, SP(pi) |= L just in case
L is in the least Herbrand model [Lloyd 1993]. However, this only holds for atomic formulas (i.e., formulas with
no logical connectives or quantifiers).
rule belongs to the hospital, according to RT’s design, the hospital controls whether or not
this statement is in the policy, so Alice has no control over whether the doctor is authorized
to modify her record.
A writers-oriented view of integrity fits RT much better.
EXAMPLE 5 (WRITERS-ORIENTED INTEGRITY). Under a writers-oriented approach
to integrity, once Alice adds the policy statement Alice.record← Hospital.doctor, the
value of a variable y having type Hospital.doctor can be assigned to a variable x hav-
ing type Alice.record. With writers-oriented integrity, Alice controls who can change the
information in her medical record.
These observations give a clear preference for the writers-oriented interpretation when
working in a trust management-style policy language such as RT[ ]. RTI integrity labels
take the writers-oriented approach for this reason.
Privacy of role-members should be preserved. Focusing on confidentiality for the mo-
ment and ignoring integrity, if the confidentiality label of variable x consists of role ρ, then
members of ρ must be permitted to know that they are members of ρ. Otherwise their
membership in ρ cannot permit them to view variable x as intended. To see this, assume
the principal in question knows that x has confidentiality ρ. Then, if the principal can see
the value x, he knows he is in ρ. If the latter is not permitted, he cannot be permitted to see
x.
Prior work using RT[ ] roles as labels [Swamy et al. 2006] has protected policy at the
role level. This means that one cannot be permitted to know that one is a member without
also being permitted to know of every other member’s membership. That is to say, it is not
possible to differentiate between a role member’s right to know about his own membership
and his right to know that the other members of ρ are members of ρ. This can be quite
undesirable: suppose Hospital.HIV patients contains all HIV patients at the hospital; if
role-level protection is used, every member of this role needs to have permission to know
of every other member’s membership.
To avoid this and related problems, RTI protects individual policy statements rather
than memberships of entire roles. This obviates the need for each member of a role to be
authorized to know all the role’s members. Instead, each member of [[A.r]]SP(Π ) need
only be able to know about each statement that is needed to prove his own membership.
The implication of this is that for each credential of the form A.r←D, D must be among
the principals that are permitted to know this statement exists. Similarly, each member of
[[B.r1]]SP(Π ) must be permitted to know that A.r←B.r1 exists.
New techniques are needed to manage control dependence. Because the labels of pol-
icy statements are dynamic values in RTI, a type-based solution to avoiding illegal flows
requires new language features. The approach we use is to establish statically a bound on
the security level of policy statements that will be considered when the policy is consulted
at run-time. This bound is used to ensure that low security assignments and policy up-
dates will not have control dependence on high security policy statements. In fact, suitable
values for these bounds are easily inferred by using the type system presented in the next
section.
4. THE RTI LANGUAGE
RTI is a simple imperative language with additional features that support (1) role-based
security labels on variables (static labels) and on policy statements (run-time labels), (2)
dynamic updates to security policy, and (3) conditions based on queries against that pol-
icy. In this section, we present RTI syntax, issues related to protecting policy statements
with dynamic security labels, RTI’s label ordering, its operational semantics, and its static
semantics (i.e., type-checking rules).
4.1 RTI Syntax
principal P
roles ρ ::= P.r
atomic labels κ ::= ρ |P
policy statements s ::= ρ←κ
queries q ::= κ1 v κ2
one-property confidentiality labels CL ::= κ |CL1 unionsq CL2
one-property integrity labels IL ::= κ | IL1 u IL2
two-property labels ` ::= (CL, IL)
one-property confidentiality bounds CB ::= CL |CB1 u CB2
one-property integrity bounds IB ::= IL | IB1 unionsq IB2
two-property bound b ::= (CB , IB)
types t ::= . . . | pol
security types τ ::= t`
policy Π ::= {〈s1, `1〉, . . . , 〈sm, `m〉}
policy context Q ::= {〈q1, b1〉, . . . , 〈qn, bn〉}
update δ ::= add | del
updates ∆ ::= δ(〈s, `〉) | δ(〈s, `〉),∆
expressions E ::= true | false |x |E ⊕ E
statements S ::= skip |S;S | try(Q,pc)S |x := E | while (E)S |
if (E)S S | if (〈q, b〉)S S | update ∆
Fig. 1. Syntax of RTI.
statements S ::= skip | if (E)S S | if (〈q, b〉)S S | update ∆
S′ ::= x := E | skip |S′;S′ | if (〈q, b〉)S′ S′
| if (E)S′ S′ | while (E)S′
S′′ ::= S′ | tryQ S |S′′;S′′
Fig. 2. Alternate statement syntax of RTI.
Figure 1 presents a grammar for RTI syntax. Like most of the previous approaches for
security-typed languages, RTI adds a static security label ` to each each program variable’s
data type t, forming t`. As is commonly done, a security label ` in RTI is actually a pair
of labels 〈CL, IL〉. A join of principals and roles, CL represents the confidentiality level;
IL is a meet of principals and roles, and represents the integrity level of the associated
variable. CL denotes all the principals that can view the information bearing that label. IL
denotes all the principals that can modify the contents of the variable—the writers-oriented
interpretation of integrity.
In RTI, policy statements also have this kind of two-part labels, though in this case,
the labels are dynamic objects as well as static. As we discuss below in section 4.5, the
type-checking rules also use security bounds, b, to annotate the statements of the program.
Security bounds resemble security labels, but have a slightly more general syntactic form,
as explained below in section 4.3. Apart from the normal data-types in the programming
language, the RTI language also has a special type ‘pol’ for typing a set of updates.
A policy statement, s, is an RT[ ] statement. In the context of confidentiality, ρ1 ← κ
means that the value of a variable with label ρ1 can flow to a variable labeled κ. In the
context of integrity, ρ1 ← κmeans that a variable labeled ρ1 can be written to by a variable
labeled κ.
The policy, Π, is a run-time structure that consists of a set of (policy statement, label)
pairs 〈s, `〉 ∈ Π. The presence of 〈s, `〉 ∈ Π indicates that observers that have a security
level dominating ` are permitted see that s is in Π. Note that if any observer sees s as being
in Π, then s is in fact in Π. It is impossible for the view of a low observer to show s is
in Π, while a high observer sees that s is not in Π. The statements s in Π define the label
ordering.
The RTI programming language consists of three new statements in addition to a simple
imperative programming language: a conditional statement that queries the dynamic pol-
icy, a policy update statement, and a try statement that is used to safely encapsulate policy
updates. A policy query, q, tests whether two atomic labels are ordered. The then-branch of
the conditional containing q is compiled under the assumption that this relationship holds.
In this way, a static approximation of the dynamic policy is built up within nested condi-
tionals. This approximation Q, consisting of a set of order relationships, is used by the
type system to determine the security of information flows.
The policy update statement supports addition and deletion of policy statements during
the execution of the program. Policy updates must be embedded with in a try statement,
tryQ S, which specifies a policy context Q containing all the policy queries used in its
body S.
This illustrates that fact that programs must conform to the syntax shown in figure 2,
which is more restrictive than the one given in figure 1. In a try statement, the statement
S must consist of conditionals, query conditionals and update statements only. (In particu-
lar, sequential composition of statements is not permitted.) While one could enforce these
restrictions syntactically, as shown in figure 2, it simplifies the proofs if we reduce the
number of syntactic categories by using the syntax shown in figure 1, and instead enforce
these restrictions in the static typing rules. We show how this is done below in section 4.5.
The try statement acts as a placeholder, enabling the syntactic restrictions to ensure that
should an update statement change the policy in such a way as to violate the assumptions
under which the executing code segment was type-checked, there are no further statements
to execute in that code segment, so there is no opportunity for information-flow restrictions
to be violated. Specifically, the syntactic restrictions ensure that after the update occurs,
no other changes to the configuration can be made prior to exiting all policy-query condi-
tionals.
4.2 Supporting Fine-grained Metapolicy
In RTI, each policy query q is annotated with a bound b = (CB , IB) that determines which
policy statements are used when evaluating the query at run-time. A statement 〈s, `〉 ∈ Π
is used if ` v2 b. This ensures that any policy statement that is used is less confidential
that CB , and that its integrity must be at least as great as IB . The purpose of using only
such policy statements is to ensure that subsequent modifications to public or high integrity
output channels (variables or policy statements) does not depend on sensitive or unreliable
policy statements used to evaluate the query.
The query bound b is inferred using RTI’s static semantics in a manner that ensures it
is dominated by the labels of all output channels that are modified in either branch of the
query conditional. In this inference process, RTI’s static semantics defines the bound on a
policy query to be the meet of the labels of the output channels that can be modified within
the scope of the policy-query conditional. This has the required effect of ensuring that
no information flow restrictions will be violated because of a low security output channel
depending on a high security policy statement.
As mentioned in the previous section, RTI’s static semantics uses policy-query condi-
tionals to derive a static approximation of the dynamic policy that is in force when a given
code region is reached. In the then-branch, the query is assumed to hold. However, within
the else-branch one cannot assume that the query does not hold, since in general not all pol-
icy statements are used to evaluate the query. In this sense, query evaluation is incomplete
in RTI.
4.3 Label Ordering
The incompleteness of query evaluation identified above places a significant requirement
on the order relation v. It needs to be monotonic in the sense that adding statements to the
policy can cause a false query to become true, but not a true query to become false. This
is necessary because the then-branch of a conditional that tests whether a query is true is
type-checked under the assumption that the ordering relationship given by the query in fact
holds. With a non-monotonic order relation, it would be possible for the query to evaluate
to true because only low security policy statements can be considered in the context where
the query happens to occur, while it would fail to hold if the full policy were used. Clearly
this would make it unsound to type-check the then-branch under the assumption that the
query holds.
Unfortunately, the ordering relation used in Rx, the prior work using RT[ ]-based secu-
rity labels, is not monotonic. In Rx, given a dynamic policy pi, the judgment pi ` ρ1 vRx
ρ2 is defined to hold if [[ρ1]]SP(pi) ⊇ [[ρ2]]SP(pi). The following example illustrates that this
ordering is not monotonic.
EXAMPLE 6. Consider the policies pi1 = {A.r ← D,B.r1 ← D} and pi2 = pi1 ∪
{B.r1←E}. We have pi1 ` A.r vRx B.r1, but pi2 6` A.r vRx B.r1.
To achieve monotonicity, RTI uses a stronger ordering relation that is based on logical
entailment, rather than on subset ordering. In RTI, pi ` A.r vRTI B.r1 if SP(pi) |=
∀x.m(B, r1, x) ⇒ m(A, r, x). Henceforth in this paper we omit the subscript, writing
simplyv forvRTI . This ordering requires that in all models of pi, the implication holds—
not only in the minimal model.
EXAMPLE 7. Referring again to the policies above, we have pi1 6` A.r v B.r1, and
also pi2 6` A.r v B.r1. In particular, pi1 6` A.r v B.r1 because there are models of SP(pi)
that, for example, make m(B, r1, F ) hold without making m(A, r, F ) hold. However,
taking pi3 = {A.r←B.r1, B.r1←D} and pi4 = pi3 ∪ {B.r1←E}, we have pi3 ` A.r v
B.r1, and pi4 ` A.r v B.r1.
The policy pi is a set of policy statements {s1, . . . , sn}. It should be thought of consisting
of the policy statements that are visible at some security level. We use a bound function,
given by the notation Π b, to calculate such a pi at run-time. The expression Π b denotes
the subset of Π consisting of statements that are visible at the security level given by b. As
we must take care not to leak information about high security policy statements that could
help prove that some `′ is dominated by b, we define Π  b to be the greatest fixpoint of a
monotonic function fb : ℘(Π)→ ℘(Π), projected onto the statements:
Π b = {s | ∃`′.〈s, `′〉 ∈ fΠb ↓ω}
Π> = {s | ∃`′.〈s, `′〉 ∈ Π}
fΠb ↓0= Π fΠb ↓i+1= fΠb (fΠb ↓i) fΠb ↓ω= ui<ωfΠb ↓i
fΠb (bΠ) = {〈s, `′〉 ∈ Π | bΠ> ` `′ v2 b}
EXAMPLE 8. Let Π = {〈A.r1←B.r2, 〈C.r3, A〉〉, 〈D.r4←E.r5, 〈A.r1, D〉〉} and let
` = (B.r2, A uD). Then fΠ` ↓0= Π, fΠ` ↓1= {〈D.r4←E.r5, A.r1〉}, and fΠ` ↓2= ∅.
As shown in figure 1, one-property confidentiality and integrity labels are, respectively,
joins and meets of individual atomic labels. One-property confidentiality and integrity
bounds are, respectively, meets of confidentiality labels and joins of integrity labels. If we
take equivalence classes of labels with respect to logical equivalence, this gives us semi-
lattices (specifically, a join-semi-lattice for confidentiality labels and meet-semi-lattice for
integrity labels.) Taking equivalence classes of each kind of bound yields a full lattice.
Fortunately it is not necessary to compare arbitrary elements, as doing so is in general in-
tractable. We show presently that all the comparisons that might occur during the execution
of the program can be evaluated by straight-forward decomposition.
Tractable label ordering. We extend v to single-property labels and bounds as follows.
Let L ::= CL | IL | CB | IB .
pi ` L1 v L2 if SP(pi) |= ∀x.ϕL1(x)⇐ ϕL2(x)
in which
ϕP (x) ≡ x = P
ϕP.r(x) ≡ m(P, r, x)
ϕL1unionsqL2(x) ≡ ϕL1(x) ∧ ϕL2(x)
ϕL1uL2(x) ≡ ϕL1(x) ∨ ϕL2(x)
This order relation is easily computed as follows (whenever it is obvious from the context,
we elide pi ` in the following computations):
κ1 v κ2 ≡ κ1 = κ2 ∨ ∃ρ3.(ρ3←κ2 ∈ pi ∧ pi ` κ1 v ρ3))
κ v CL1 unionsq CL2 ≡ κ v CL1 ∨ κ v CL2
CL1 unionsq CL2 v CL3 ≡ CL1 v CL3 ∧ CL2 v CL3
CL v CB1 u CB2 ≡ CL v CB1 ∧ CL v CB2
IL1 u IL2 v κ ≡ IL1 v κ ∨ IL2 v κ
IL1 v IL2 u IL3 ≡ IL1 v IL2 ∧ IL1 v IL3
IB1 unionsq IB2 v IL ≡ IB1 v IL ∧ IB2 v IL
Ordering relationships can be evaluated efficiently because we never have need to eval-
uate relationships of the form CB1 u CB2 v CB3 or IB1 v IB2 unionsq IB3.
We use v2 for the order over two-property labels and bounds. Two-property labels are
ordered by
(CL, IL) v2 (CB , IB) ≡ CL v CB ∧ IB v IL
Notice the contra-variance with the integrity part of the label; `1 v2 `2 means that data
labeled `1 has lower confidentiality but higher integrity than data labeled `2. This is the
circumstance in which information flow from data labeled `1 to data labeled `2.
We use the following projection operators, which extract the one-property labels and
bounds represented by a two-property label and bounds.
|(CL, IL)|C = CL |(CL, IL)|I = IL
|(CB , IB)|C = CB |(CB , IB)|I = IB
The join and meet of two-property labels and bounds are as follows:
`1 unionsq `2 = (|`1|C unionsq |`2|C , |`1|I u |`2|I)
b1 u b2 = (|b1|C u |b2|C , |b1|I unionsq |b2|I)
4.4 Operational Semantics
E .Ψ = · Ψ′ = (tryQS)
E , tryQS −→ E [Ψ = Ψ′], tryQS
(E-Tr1)
E .Ψ 6= · E , S −→ E ′, S1
E , tryQS −→ E ′, tryQS1
(E-Tr2)
E .Ψ 6= ·
E , tryQskip −→ E [Ψ = ·], skip
(E-Tr3)
Π′ = update(E .Π,∆) E .Ψ = (tryQS)
E , update ∆ −→ E [Π = Π′], skip
(E-Up)
(E .Π) b ` q ⇒ j = 1 (E .Π) b 6` q ⇒ j = 2
E , if (〈q, b〉)S1 S2 −→ E , Sj
(E-IfQ)
In which update(Π, {add(〈s, `〉)} ∪∆) = update(Π ∪ {〈s, `〉},∆)
update(Π, {del(〈s, `〉)} ∪∆) = update(Π\{〈s, `′〉 | 〈s, `′〉 ∈ Π ∧Π `′ ` ` v2 `′},∆)
update(Π, ∅) = Π
Fig. 3. Operational semantics
The operational semantics of RTI is shown in figure 3. Each rule in it contributes to
the definition of the relation E , S −→ E ′, S′, which defines one step of execution of the
program. The configuration E is defined as follows:
execution configuration E ::= (Π;M ; Ψ)
dynamic snapshot Ψ ::= (S′′)|·
An execution configuration E consists of the current dynamic policy, Π, the memory state,
M , and a dynamic snapshot, Ψ, consisting of the tryQ statement in which the current
statement being executed is nested, if any. Ψ is used to determine whether the execution is
inside a try block.
The simple imperative programming language constructs follow the standard one-step
semantics and therefore are omitted here. The first four rules in figure 3 are used to evaluate
the statements inside the try. (E-Tr1) represents the state transition when a try statement
is reached. Before a try is entered, the try statement is preserved in the dynamic snapshot.
(E-Tr2) is used when the statement inside the try takes a step. (E-Tr3) marks the end of
the try. The dynamic snapshot is reverted to an empty state when the try is exited.
(E-IfQ) states that if the dynamic policy visible to observers at level b prove query q,
then the then-branch of the conditional is executed, otherwise the else-branch is executed.
(E-Up) defines the execution of a policy update statement. Since a policy update can
happen only inside a try, (E-Up) rule requires E .Ψ to be non-empty. As part of an update,
the result of any query in Q could change as a result of the policy update. If so, it is
possible that continuing to execute normally would execute code that was type-checked
under assumptions about the policy that no longer hold after the policy update. Doing so
would be unsafe. Therefore, we prevent any other memory or policy update statement to
occur inside the same conditional branches as the update statement using our static typing
rules in section 4.5.
In (E-Up), the function update(Π,∆) (see figure 3) updates the policy. Deletes are an
interesting case of policy updates, which remove only those occurrences of a statement that
are at least as protected as the label in the update. If the parameters to a del are 〈s, `′〉,
then any 〈s, `〉 ∈ Π will be removed just in case ` v2 `′.
4.5 Static Semantics
The policy context, Ω, which is used to type-check the program, can be summarized as
follows:
typing context Ω ::= (Γ; pc;Q; Φ)
syntactic context Φ ::= try| · |∗
Ω is the static typing context, which includes a type binding for variables, Γ, the current
program counter, pc, the query context, Q, and the syntactic context, Φ. In addition to
labeling each program statement with a bound, RTI uses pc to keep track of the security
level of the context. The pc value that is used to type check a given program statement
is the least upper bound of the security labels of data inspected in conditionals that deter-
mine whether that statement is reached by execution. It is used to ensure that there is no
unauthorized information flow from those conditionals to assignments or policy updates
occurring in the statement. Similarly, the policy context, Q, keeps track of all the queries
encountered to reach a particular program point.
A syntactic context is a flag having value try, · or ∗. It is used to encode whether
the current context is inside a try statement (when Φ = try), outside a try or a query
conditional statement (when Φ = ·), or inside a query conditional but not inside a try
(when Φ = ∗). This information is then used to enable the type rules to enforce the
syntactic restrictions that are present in the syntax shown in figure 2, but absent from that
in figure 1. Specifically, the try statement must not occur inside a query conditional, the
assignment statement must not occur inside a try statement, a sequence of statements must
not occur inside a try, and the update statement occurs only inside a try.
The static typing rules are given in figure 4. The static semantics of RTI are defined by
the typing relations Ω ` E : t` and Ω ` S′′ : b cmd. An expression, E, has type t`, where t
denotes the normal data type of the expression and ` is a two-property security label. The
type of the expression is the least upper bound of the labels of all its sub-expressions. In
Ω ` S′′ : b cmd, b will be the greatest lower bound of the labels of all output channels
.Q ` κ v κ
Q ` κ1 v κ2 (κ2 v κ3, b) ∈ Q
Q ` κ1 v κ3
Q ` κ v CL1
Q ` κ v CL1 unionsq CL2
Q ` κ v CL2 unionsq CL1
Q ` κ v CL1 unionsq CL2
Q ` IL1 v κ
Q ` IL1 u IL2 v κ
Q ` IL2 v κ
Q ` IL1 u IL2 v κ
Q ` CL2 v CL3 Q ` CL1 v CL3
Q ` CL1 unionsq CL2 v CL3
Q ` CL v CB1 Q ` CL v CB2
Q ` CL v CB1 u CB2
Q ` IL1 v IL2 Q ` IL1 v IL3
Q ` IL1 v IL2 u IL3
Q ` IB1 v IL Q ` IB2 v IL
Q ` IB1 unionsq IB2 v IL
Q ` |`1|C v |`2|C Q ` |`2|I v |`1|I
Q ` `1 v2 `2
Q ` CL1 unionsq CL2 v CL3 Q ` IL3 v IL1 u IL2
Q ` (CL1, IL1) unionsq (CL2, IL2) v2 (CL3, IL3)
Q ` CL1 v CL2 unionsq CL3 Q ` IL2 u IL3 v IL1
Q ` (CL1, IL1) v2 (CL2, IL2) unionsq (CL3, IL3)
Q ` CL v CB1 u CB2 Q ` IB1 unionsq IB2 v IL
Q ` (CL, IL) v2 (CB1, IB1) u (CB2, IB2)
Ω.Q ` Ω.pc v2 `
Ω ` δ(〈s, `〉) : pol`
(T-AddDel1)
Ω ` ∆ : polb′ Ω.Q ` Ω.pc v2 `
Ω ` (δ(〈s, `〉),∆) : pol`ub′
(T-AddDel2)
Ω ` x : t`1 Ω ` E : t`2 Ω.Φ ∈ {·, ∗}
Ω.Q ` `2 v `1 Ω.Q ` Ω.pc v2 `1
Ω ` x := E : `1 cmd
(T-Assign)
Ω.Φ ∈ {·, ∗}
Ω ` S1 : b1 cmd Ω ` S2 : b2 cmd
Ω ` S1;S2 : (b1 u b2) cmd
(T-Seq)
Γ; pc;Q; Φ ` E : t`
Γ; pc unionsq `;Q; Φ ` S1 : b1 cmd Γ; pc unionsq `;Q; Φ ` S2 : b2 cmd
Γ; pc;Q; Φ ` if(E) S1 S2 : b1 u b2 cmd
(T-IfE)
Φ = try ⇒ Φ′ = try Φ ∈ {·, ∗} ⇒ Φ′ = ∗
Γ; pc;Q ∪ {〈q, b〉}; Φ′ ` S1 : b1 cmd
Γ; pc;Q; Φ′ ` S2 : b2 cmd b = b1 u b2
Γ; pc;Q; Φ ` if(〈q, b〉) S1 S2 : b cmd
(T-IfQ)
Γ; pc; ∅; try ` S : b cmd
Γ; pc; ∅; · ` tryQ′S : b cmd
(T-Try)
Γ; pc;Q; try ` ∆ : polb
Γ; pc;Q; try ` update(∆) : b cmd
(T-Up)
Fig. 4. Static type-checking rules
that can be modified inside S. This bound is important because policy statements that have
labels not dominated by it cannot safely be used to evaluate policy queries that govern
conditional execution of S. The impact of this will be seen in our discussion of the (T-IfQ)
rule below.
The first set of rules in figure 4 specify the label ordering in RTI. The interpretation of
the label ordering under the static policy context Q corresponds to the interpretation of the
ordering with respect to the dynamic policy Π as defined in Section 4.3.
The (T-AddDel1) rule types the expression with the policy type and the security level
associated with the policy statement. The (T-AddDel2) rule specifies the security level of
a set of add or del commands as the greatest lower bound of all the levels of individual
add or del commands. Note that (T-AddDel1) and (T-AddDel2) verify that the labels of
statements that are added or removed from the policy are at least as restrictive as the pc.
The (T-Assign), (T-Seq), and (T-IfE) give the typing rules for the normal assignment,
sequential statements and the conditionals, respectively. For an assignment statement to
type-check, the level of the output variable should dominate the level of the input expres-
sion, to disallow illegal direct flows. In addition, to prevent illegal control flows, the level
of the output variable should dominate the pc. Additionally, since the level of the output
channel is `1, the type of the assignment statement is `1 cmd. Checking whether the syn-
tactic context is either · or * ensures that the assignment statement does not occur inside
a try, where the context would be try. The same is the case in (T-Seq). The type rules for
(T-Seq) and (T-IfE) are typed similar to those in previous approaches.
The (T-IfQ) rule defines the conditions for the query conditional statement to type-check.
The value of b in the query can actually be inferred by using this rule, based on the values of
b1 and b2 in the premise of this rule. The query 〈q, b〉 is added to Q, the policy context, for
the purpose of type-checking the then-branch of the conditional. If both then- and else-
branches type-check, they yield bounds b1 and b2 that correspond to the greatest lower
bound of all the output channels in each of the respective branches. The bound b = b1 u b2
on the whole conditional is again a greatest lower bound, per the third premise. Notice that
there is no need to modify the pc when descending into the branches of the conditional.
This is because the operational semantics prevents information from policy statements that
are used to evaluate the query q from flowing illegally to to output channels inside the
conditional. The operational semantics does this by ensuring that q is evaluated by using
only statements that are visible at security level b. Notice that the two branches of the
conditional are type-checked under a syntactic context Φ′, which is either try or *. If
Φ′ = try, the query conditional is already inside a try statement, thereby disallowing other
try statements inside it. Φ′ is set to * when the query conditional is not inside a try; the *
will prevent a try occurring inside this query conditional.
The (T-Try) rule says that if the statements inside the try block type-check, the try state-
ment type-checks too. We also ensure that the try statement does not occur inside another
try statement or a query conditional by requiring that it is type-checked under Φ = ·. The
(T-Up) rule defines the conditions under which the policy can be updated. The type of the
update statement polb is given by the greatest lower bound of the types of all the policy
statements in ∆. Also the update statement requires that its syntactic context be of the
form try, to ensure that it occurs inside a try statement.
5. RECOMMENDED IDIOM FOR METAPOLICY
The RTI approach to protecting policy imposes some requirements on the labels of policy
statements and variables. This section explains how these labels can be defined appropri-
ately in RTI.
The first requirement, mentioned above in section 3, is that D should be able to see
the statement A.r ← D and all members of B.r1 should be able to see the statement
A.r ← B.r1. Otherwise D and the members of B.r1 would gain no benefit from these
respective policy statements. Furthermore, any variable x having confidentiality label A.r
should have as part of its integrity label that the writers trusted to participate in defining
the membership of A.r are trusted by x.
Consider an assignment x := y in which the confidentiality labels of x and y areA.r and
C.r2 respectively. To type-check, such an assignment must be nested within conditionals
that test queries entailing C.r2 v A.r. The statements that will prove that relation at run-
time will need to be trusted according to the integrity label of x. Suppose those statements
areA.r←B.r1 andB.r1←C.r2. Now whatever other writers may be allowed to influence
the addition of these statements, the owners of the roles being defined certainly must be.
This shows that in this case the integrity label of x needs to be at most as restrictive as
the integrity labels of A.r←B.r1 and B.r1←C.r2. In the rest of this section we present
a recommended idiom, and RTI features that support it, which facilitates management of
integrity labels.
Q ` P1.r1 v P2.r2
Q ` P ′1.r′1 v P ′2.r′2 Q ` P ′.r′ v P
Fig. 5. Additional Static Type Checking Rules for Idiom
In RT, authority to specify policy statements that define a role A.r rests solely with the
ownerA. In RTI, authority to specify or modify a statement is controlled by the statement’s
integrity label. This authority interacts with the integrity labels of values that depend on
these statements and on which the definition of these statements depend. To align the
RTI integrity labels of policy statement precisely with the nature of authority over policy
statements in RT, the integrity label of each policy statement A.r← e would be just the
principal A. Indeed, in the idiom presented here, the statement A.r← e is given integrity
label A. It is straightforward to generalize this to allow A to define a role, the members
of which are delegated authority over the definition of A.r. In practice, this is likely to be
important so as to enable policy updates to depend on data from other sources. However,
for reasons of pedagogy and space, we refrain from introducing this generalization here.
EXAMPLE 9 (POLICY STATEMENT INTEGRITY). PrincipalsA,B, andD add the fol-
lowing statements to the policy Π:
〈A.r←B.r1, (B.r1, A)〉 (1)
〈B.r1←C.r2, (C.r2, B)〉 (2)
〈D.r3←E.r4, (E.r4, D)〉 (3)
Suppose that variables x and y have labels (E.r4, A.r u ILx) and (D.r3, C.r2 u ILy),
respectively. Below we will consider the appropriate values for ILx and ILy . Con-
sider the following code fragment: if(〈D.r3 v E.r4, (E.r4, A.r u ILx)〉) if(〈A.r v
C.r2, (E.r4, A.r u ILx)〉) x := y
In this example, there are two integrity requirements for the assignment to x to be legal.
The first of these is
Π (E.r4,A.ruILx) ` A.r u ILx v C.r2 u ILy (4)
which means that anyone authorized to define the value of y is also authorized to define the
value of x. The second integrity requirement is that the policy statements used to satisfy
the two queries in the containing conditionals also must have integrity that is at least as
restrictive as that of x. In other words, we require
Π (E.r4,A.ruILx) ` A.r u ILx v A ∧ (5)
Π (E.r4,A.ruILx) ` A.r u ILx v B ∧
Π (E.r4,A.ruILx) ` A.r u ILx v D
According to trust-management principles, the use of a role such as A.r in the label of
a variable x is appropriate only if A is trusted to determine an appropriate membership
for A.r, which includes trusting that when A delegates to some other principal B some
authority over the definition of A.r, B too is trusted for this purpose. Requirements (4)
and (5) illustrate the constraints that must be satisfied by the labels ILx and ILy if the
assignment is to be legal. To facilitate defining the components of integrity labels like ILx
and ILy , RTI implicitly defines and maintains a shadow role, A′.r′, for each role A.r as a
side-effect of adding a new policy statement. The shadow role A′.r′ is defined to include
all principals that have authority to define statements that add principals to A.r.
Suppose that for each of statements (1), (2), and (3), we were to add two statements to
the dynamic policy:
(1) A′.r′←A, A′.r′←B′.r′1
(2) B′.r′1←B, B′.r′1←C ′.r′2
(3) D′.r′3←D, D′.r′3←E′.r′4
We will not actually add these statements; instead we will extend the definition of what
it means for a static or dynamic policy to satisfy queries that involve shadow roles. Now
in our example, the minimum values that satisfy these constraints are ILx = A′.r′ uD′.r′3
and ILy = C ′.r′2 u D′.r′3. In general, the integrity label of any variable x should be the
meet of the following: (1) any trusted writers of the value of x; (2) P ′.r′ for each (non-
shadow) role P.r appearing in the integrity label of x; plus, optionally, (3) P ′.r′ for each
(non-shadow) role P.r appearing in the confidentiality label of any variable y or policy
statement upon which x’s value should be allowed to depend and the confidentiality label
of which is not identical to that of x. This is why the shadow role D′.r′3 is included in the
label of x in the example. Component (3) can be omitted, if the owner of x prefers not
to trust the owner of the confidentiality label of y. In this case the assignment x := y is
permitted only if ∅ ` |lab(Γ(y))|C v |lab(Γ(x))|C . By a similar analysis, it turns out that
the integrity labels of policy statements should be composed in the manner.
To support this idiom, we add the type rules shown in figure 5 and we extend the defini-
tion of pi ` κ1 v κ2 as follows:
pi ` P ′.r′ v P holds for all pi, P, and r
pi ` P ′1.r′1 v P ′2.r′2 if pi ` P1.r1 v P2.r2
6. AN EXAMPLE
Let us look at the example program in figure 6 and illustrate how the program is type-
checked and evaluated in RTI.
Specifying Security Labels. All integrity labels in the example adhere to the idiom
introduced in the previous section. The confidentiality labels on the policy statements
1. if(PatRequestsHIVtherapy){
2. try{〈Pat.HIVRvHos.HIVDocR,b1〉}{
3. if(〈Pat .HIVR v Hos.HIVDocR, b1〉)
4. update(add(〈Pat .RecsR ← Hos.HIVDocR, `1〉)); }
5. try{〈Pat.HIVRvHos.HIVDocW ,b2〉}{
6. if(〈Pat .HIVR v Hos.HIVDocW , b2〉)
7. update(add(〈Pat .RecsW ← Hos.HIVDocW , `2〉)); } }
8. if(〈Pat .RecsR v DrBob, b3〉)
9. DrDisplay := patientRec;
10. if(〈Pat .RecsW v DrBob, b4〉)
11. patientRecHIVRx := DrInput ;
in which
`0 = (Pat .HIVR,Pat)
`1 = b1 = (Hos.HIVDocR,Pat)
`2 = b2 = (Hos.HIVDocW ,Pat)
`3 = b3 = (DrBob,Pat .RecsW u Pat ′.RecsW ′ u Pat ′.RecsR′)
`4 = b4 = (Pat .RecsR,Pat .RecsW u Pat ′.RecsW ′ u Pat ′.RecsR′)
`5 = (Pat .RecsR,Pat .RecsW u Pat ′.RecsW ′)
`6 = (Pat .RecsR,DrBob u Pat ′.RecsR′)
PatRequestsHIVtherapy : bool`0
DrDisplay : Record`3
patientRec : Record`5
patientRecHIVRx : Record`4
DrInput : Record`6
Fig. 6. An example RTI program.
added in lines 4 and 6 have been selected to accommodate the high confidentiality of
PatRequestsHIVtherapy . Specifically, when the queries in the conditionals on lines 3
and 5 are satisfied, `1 and `2 dominate `0, the label of PatRequestsHIVtherapy . In prac-
tice, the code fragment comprising lines 1 through 7 needs to be executed only once for a
given patient, while lines 8 through 11 might be executed many times.
Static Typing. The type of the update statement in line 4 is obtained by using the (T-
AddDel1) static typing rule. The premise of this rule requires that Ω.Q ` pc v2 `1.
The pc is set to `0 by the conditional in line 1. At line 4 the pc remains the same,
since (T-IfQ) has no effect on the pc. The query conditional at line 3 ensures that the
set Ω.Q = {〈Pat .HIVR v Hos.HIVDocR, b1〉}. Note that it is always the case that
Q ` Pat v Pat . These two relationships combine to prove Ω.Q ` pc v2 `1. There-
fore line 4 type-checks. The query conditional in line 3 can be typed because its label
is the same as the label of statement 4. Lines 6 and 7 type-check similarly. The as-
signment on line 9 type-checks under the context Q3 = {〈Pat .RecsR v DrBob, b3〉}
becauseQ3 ` `5 v2 `3 and similarly the assignment on line 11 type-checks under the con-
text Q4 = {〈Pat .RecsW v DrBob, b4〉} (the integrity part being the more interesting:
Q4 ` Pat .RecsW uPat ′.RecsW ′ uPat ′.RecsR′ v DrBob uPat ′.RecsR′) ; pc = ⊥ in
both contexts. This ensures that the query conditionals on line 8 and 10 type-check.
Execution. Before the execution of statement 1, let the dynamic policy, Π, be
{〈Hos.HIVDocR ← DrBob, `7〉, (6)
〈Hos.HIVDocW ← DrBob, `7〉, (7)
〈Pat .HIVR ← Hos.HIVDocR, `1〉, (8)
〈Pat .HIVR ← Hos.HIVDocW , `2〉} (9)
in which `7 = (DrBob,Hos). Policy statements (6) and (7) indicate that Dr.Bob is
an HIV specialist. Through policy statements (8) and (9), the patient indicates that HIV
doctors that are allowed to read and write HIV-related patient records are authorized to
know whether the patient has requested HIV therapy. If PatRequestsHIVtherapy is true,
program statements 4 and 7 add two new policy statements to the dynamic policy, which
allow the hospital HIV specialists to view and change the patient’s health record:
〈Pat .RecsR ← Hos.HIVDocR, `1〉 (10)
〈Pat .RecsW ← Hos.HIVDocW , `2〉 (11)
Once these policy statements are added, the dynamic policy satisfies the conditionals in
statements 8 and 10. The query on line 8 is satisfied by policy statements (6) and (10);
these policy statements can both be used to evaluate the query because Π  b3 ` `7 v2 b3
and Π  b3 ` `1 v2 b3. The fact that Π  b3 ` |b3|I v |`7|I follows because pi `
Hos ′.HIVDocR′ v Hos holds for all pi, and Π  b3 ` Pat ′.RecsR′ v Hos ′.HIVDocR′
follows from Π  b3 ` Pat .RecsR v Hos.HIVDocR, which holds because policy state-
ment (10) is in Π  b3 . (This last point follows from Π  b3 ` `1 v2 b3.) Note that
determining that `1 v2 b3 makes use of policy statement (6). The query on line 10 is
satisfied similarly by using policy statements (7) and (11). Therefore Dr.Bob can view the
patient’s records and also give a diagnosis and prescription to the patient.
Considering another case whereDr.Bob is not in fact an HIV specialist. Hos.HIVDocR
← DrBob and Hos.HIVDocW ← DrBob are not included in Π. The variable DrInput
is still labeled (Pat .RecsR,DrBob) and the program type-checks statically, but the execu-
tion semantics will not execute the assignments in lines 9 and 11 because Π will not prove
the query conditionals on lines 8 and 10.
In a third case, if the variable PatRequestsHIVtherapy is not true, or one of the query
conditionals on line 3 or 6 are not satisfied by the dynamic policy Π, the update statements
on lines 4 and 7 are not executed, and the corresponding policy statements are not added.
Therefore, the conditionals in lines 8 and 10 will not be true. This again ensures that the
sensitive patient’s record is not leaked to any unauthorized person.
7. NONINTERFERENCE
In this section, we present the noninterference theorem for RTI. The full proof of the the-
orem can be found in the appendix. The strategy of the proof follows that of Swamy et
al. [Swamy et al. 2006], which in turn uses the proof technique of Pottier and Simonet [Pot-
tier and Simonet 2003]. Much of the material in this section follows Swamy et al. quite
closely.
An execution of a program S0 starting in the configuration E0 is denoted by 〈E0, S0〉 and
is a (possibly infinite) sequence of configurations E0, E1, . . . and programs S0, S1, . . . such
that each step of execution is performed according to the operational semantics; Ei, Si −→
Policy:
Π|R = ΠFR
Memory:
M |R,Π = {(x,M(x)) | ∃ρ ∈ R .ΠFR ` lab(Γ(x)) v ρ}
Dynamic snapshot:
·|R,Π = · (S′′)|R,Π = (S′′)
Configuration:
(Π,M,Ψ)|R = (ΠR,M |R,Π, ·)
Trace:
(E1, E2, α)|R =
{ E1|R if declass(R, E1.Π, E2.Π) 6= ∅
E1|R, (E2, α)|R otherwise
inwhich
declass(R,Π1,Π2) = (ρL(R,Π2) ∩ ρH(R,Π1))
ρL(R,Π) = {ρ | ∃ρR ∈ R.ΠFR ` ρ v ρR}
ρH(R,Π) = {ρ | ∀ρR ∈ R.ΠFR 6` ρ v ρR}
Fig. 7. Trace observability
Ei+1, Si+1. The sequence of configurations E0, E1, . . . obtained in this way is called a trace
and is written Tr(〈E0, S0〉). We use α to denote a possibly empty trace and E , α to denote
the concatenation of a single configuration and a trace.
The attacker’s observation level is presumed to be given by a set of roles R. We assume
a type environment Γ is given. The restriction of a trace α to observation levelR is denoted
by α|R, and is defined in figure 7. As long as the policy remains unchanged, a restricted
trace consists of a restriction to each configuration element of the trace. (This is the “oth-
erwise” case of the Trace definition in the figure. In this case, the first configuration is
restricted to R and then the definition recurs.) Restricting the individual configurations
restricts the view of memory (according to Π and Γ), the policy, and the snapshot. Note
that lab(Γ(x)) refers to the label associated with the content of variable x. The policy is
restricted by removing the policy statements that are not observable to R.
If a policy update results in declassification with respect to the attacker’s roles R, then
the trace is truncated, as specified in the first case of the Trace definition in the figure. The
set of roles given by declas(R, E1.Π, E2.Π) is non-empty when the execution step from E1
to E2 changes the policy in a way that makes some role change from being unobservable
to being observable by the attacker. This is exactly the case in which a declassification has
occurred that is observable to R. Note that the definitions of ρL(R,Π) and ρH(R,Π) use
only those statements that are observable to the attacker given by R to determine which
roles are observable to the attacker. Below we often write simply ρL and ρH , with the
parameters R and Π being implicit.
The way that trace observability is defined, computation steps that change unobservable
portions of the configuration appear to make no change whatsoever. The presence of re-
peated, unchanged configurations is called stuttering. We write α .= β if α and β are two
different trace sequences, but are identical when unchanged configurations are eliminated.
The statement of noninterference uses the notion of well-formed configuration, written
Ω |= E , which says that the execution configuration is consistent with the static context
used to type-check the program.
DEFINITION 10 WELL-FORMED CONFIGURATION. A configuration E = (Π,M,Ψ)
is well-formed with respect to a context Ω, denoted by Ω |= E , if and only if all the following
are true:
(1) dom(M) ⊆ dom(Ω.Γ)
(2) ∀〈q, b〉 ∈ Ω.Q.Π b ` q
Clause (1) ensures that all the memory locations are assigned a type. Clause (2) checks
that the static approximation, Q, is consistent with the dynamic policy Π. Note that clause
(2) takes account of the fact that queries in Q have associated labels.
LEMMA 11 (STATIC LABEL ORDERING SOUNDNESS). For all contexts Ω and pro-
grams S, if the derivation of Ω ` S contains a sub-derivation of Ω′ ` S′, then the following
holds for all policies Π:
(∀〈q, b〉 ∈ Ω′.Q . (Π b ` q))⇒
(∀`1, `2.Ω′.Q ` `1 v2 `2 ⇒ Π> ` `1 v2 `2)
Noninterference is proved by relating execution traces of well-formed configurations.
The idea is to show that for any attacker, if two such configurations agree on the portions
of them that the attacker can observe, then the execution traces restricted to the attacker’s
observation level will be equivalent up to stuttering.
THEOREM 12 (NONINTERFERENCE). Suppose that for an RTI program S and a pair
of configurations E0 and E1 there exists a context Ω such that Ω ` S, Ω |= E0, and Ω |= E1.
Then for any set of roles R, whenever both 〈E0, S〉 and 〈E1, S〉 terminate, we have
E0|ψR = E1|ψR ⇒ Tr(〈E0, S〉)|R .= Tr(〈E1, S〉)|R
Intuitively, the proof shows that when executing a type-correct RTI program S, the ef-
fects observable to a low-security observer are independent of the high-security parts of
the memory and policy with which the program executes. The proof is a straightforward
inductive application of the Subject Reduction Theorem, which is proved in the appendix.
Because policy updates change the definitions of high and low security, the noninterference
result guarantees only that this independence holds at each execution step with respect to
the policy in effect at that step. As in [Swamy et al. 2006], our noninterference result
focuses on confidentiality and observability. Because our formulation of data integrity is
essentially identical, the same argument can be used to show that data and policy integrity
is preserved. We do not consider timing or termination channels.
8. COMPARISON OF RX AND RTI
As we already stated earlier, RTI is closely related to another previous work in type-based
information flow analysis, Rx. The syntax of RTI resembles that of Rx. Rx consists of
RT[ ] roles as labels of variables, RT[ ] policy statements as run-time policy statements,
policy update statements and policy queries that approximate the run-time policy. How-
ever, RTI differs from Rx with respect to the ordering relation and the metapolicy. We have
already illustrated some of the differences in Sections 3 and 4.2. We discuss the rest of the
differences in this section.
Metapolicy. In Rx roles, like variables, are also protected by a pair of security labels.
These security labels constitute what Rx calls the metapolicy of a role. Rx also uses the
readers-oriented notion of integrity. We discuss some of the problems caused by these de-
sign choices in section3. RTI proposes the writer-oriented view of integrity and protecting
policy statements instead of individual roles as solutions to these problems. Thus Rx’s
readers-oriented integrity model follows the trust model and RTI follows the writer model
and DLM as described by Li et al. [Li et al. 2003].
Rx uses the notation CΠ(ρ) to denote the confidentiality label of ρ. Because Rx uses
role-level protection, Rx requires [[ρ]]SP(Π ) ⊆ [[CΠ(ρ)]]SP(Π ).
In Rx, there is another strong, problematic constraint on the meta-label of a role. If
the membership of role ρ depends on the membership of role ρ′ (e.g., because there is a
policy statement ρ← ρ′), then the metapolicy of ρ must be at least as restrictive as the
metapolicy for ρ′, i.e., [[CΠ(ρ)]]SP(Π ) ⊆ [[CΠ(ρ′)]]SP(Π ). This is because members of ρ
can observe the effect of changes to the membership of ρ′ via their effect on ρ. In general, ρ
depends on ρ′ if it delegates transitively to ρ′. An unfortunate consequence is that if a new
statement such asA.r←E is added to the policy in the previous paragraph, the principalE
should be added not only to [[CΠ(A.r)]]SP(Π ), but also to [[CΠ(B.r)]]SP(Π ), thus changing
the denotation of CΠ(B.r) each time a new principal is added to A.r. More importantly,
any principal A can enable himself to view all the members of B.r merely by adding a
statement such as A.r←B.r. For example, a medical supplier could guess what disease
Alice has by defining a new role MedSup.snoop, including himself in that role, adding the
rule MedSup.snoop←Alice.record, and then observing that external specialist Bob can
read Alice’s medical record.
Swamy et al. suggest that one might mitigate this problem by using the integrity label
CΠ(B.r) to prevent unauthorized delegation to B.r. The idea is to require that all the
data tested in conditionals leading to an update that adds a statement of the form A.r←
B.r should be trusted by everyone that trusts the value of [[B.r]]SP(Π ). This could be
accomplished by using the component of that static context known as the program counter
(pc), which summarizes the security levels of data tested in conditionals leading to a given
point in the program.
This, however, seems unintuitive. The integrity label of B.r now has a major role in
protecting the confidentiality of B.r. One expects the integrity label of an object to control
how its value can be defined, not how its value can be used. Furthermore, members of
roles must all agree before their role can be included in another role. In a highly decentral-
ized environment, this does not seem conducive to scalability. Role owners should have
autonomy to define their roles however they wish. Overall, this requires that the action of
modifying the definition of CΠ(ρ′) should be decoupled from the act of introducing a new
statement ρ←ρ′.
By contrast, RTI leverages the implicit assumptions used in trust management policy.
When A creates A.r← B.r, this means that A trusts B to correctly define the member-
ship of B.r. Therefore, the principals who trust the membership of A.r implicitly trust
A, B, and all the other principals whose roles the membership of A.r depends on. On
the other hand, since in RTI, membership in [[A.r]]SP(Π ) does not imply membership in
[[CΠ(B.r)]]SP(Π ), there is no need for the members of [[B.r]]SP(Π ) to trust the pc (at the
point the update is performed). This will make policy management more scalable.
Transactions. Rx uses a transaction construct for two purposes. First, it ensures that in
the operational semantics, when a policy update is performed, if it causes a violation of the
assumptions under which the currently executing code region was type-checked, control
breaks out of that region. This is accomplished in RTI by the try construct. Second,
transactions attempt to address the problem of illegal transitive flows, in which data flows
from x to y under one policy and then from y to z after a policy modification, yet neither
policy authorized the flow from x to z. While transactions can enable a programmer to
avoid such illegal flows by placing all flows within a single transaction, Rx does not strictly
enforce this and it is often not practical to enforce it either(different flows might be in
different methods of the program). In RTI we have omitted transactions in the interest of
simplicity and because they do not provide a comprehensive solution to the problem they
are designed to address.
9. RELATED WORK
Our related work, as discussed below, occurs in two different areas: trust management and
language based security.
9.1 Trust Management
Trust management was introduced by Blaze et al. [Blaze et al. 1996] as a problem in net-
work security for which the authors proposed an approach based on a small collection of
general principles, the most important for our context being decentralization of control.
The first trust management system, called PolicyMaker, was also introduced, followed by
its descendant, KeyNote [Blaze et al. 1999]. These systems were designed to support dele-
gation of authorization to use specific resources. About the same time as PolicyMaker, the
Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure (SDSI) [Rivest and Lampson 1996] was intro-
duced. Rather than delegation of authorization, SDSI focused on naming. Because SDSI
names can be used to represent groups or roles, there is a strong relationship between SDSI
and RT, though full RT is much richer. (RTI barely scratches the surface of RT’s expressive
power.) More recently, many other trust management systems have been designed and ana-
lyzed (e.g., [Gunter and Jim 2000; Appel and Felten 1999; Jim and Suciu 2001] to identify
just a few). We use RT because of its usage of roles, its support for highly decentralized
policy definition, and its simple declarative semantics.
9.2 Language Based Security
In language based information flow analysis techniques [Sabelfeld and Myers 2003], se-
curity labels form a lattice according to the lattice model of security proposed by Den-
ning [Denning 1976]. These approaches statically check whether the program satisfies the
noninterference property [Goguen and Meseguer 1982] with respect to the security lattice.
Initial security lattices were simple with only two security levels, high and low [Volpano
et al. 1996; Denning and Denning 1977]. A high or low security label was associated with
the variables based on ownership and access policies. Myers et al. [Myers and Liskov
2000] incorporated the policies based on ownerships and flows directly into the security
lattice in their Decentralized Label Model (DLM). The security label consists of confi-
dentiality label and integrity label pair. The confidentiality label consists of owners of the
variable and the readers who could read the information in the variable. The integrity label
consists of owners and writers who could write to the variable. The security label in RTI
also follows the same confidentiality and integrity model for the security labels.
Most of the work in language-based information flow [Sabelfeld and Myers 2003;
Broberg and Sands 2006] assumes that the security lattice is known at compile-time and
remains fixed during program execution. Noninterference was proved with respect to the
static lattice. Realistic code, however, needs to execute in different environments and
the security lattice might change based on the environment. Dynamic principals and la-
bels [Myers et al. ; Chong and Myers 2004; Tse and Zdancewic 2004] that could be in-
stantiated at run-time were proposed to allow dynamic querying of the security lattice. To
type-check the programs statically, the languages provided constructs similar to our policy
query. These approaches, however, did not provide a way to change the security lattice at
run-time.
In contrast, similar to previous work by Hicks et al. [Hicks et al. 2005] and Swamy et
al. [Swamy et al. 2006], we provide an update statement to dynamically update the security
lattice. We also provide fine-grained protection to the security lattice by protecting the
dynamic policy statements with the help of a security label. The net effect is that different
principals observe different lattices based on their observation level. Although Rx also
protects the lattice, their protection is more coarse-grained because any principal that is
allowed to access a particular role, is permitted by the metapolicy of Rx to observe the
entire sub-lattice dominated by the role.
Many previous approaches propose some form of declassification construct based on
various constraints (see [Sabelfeld and Sands 2007] for a survey). This construct allows
temporary change in the security lattice order, such that if a particular value is sufficiently
general, according to some constraints, it can be released on a low security output channel.
For instance, this might be done if the value has been encrypted. However, one might not
want to release other values that have the same security label. Our approach, supports a
related, but rather different operation: update statements permanently change the security
lattice. If an update results in a value becoming less strictly protected, all the values that
are protected by the roles involved are affected. In order to provide declassification in the
classical sense, we can extend our approach with a declassification construct that changes
the lattice temporarily.
Another useful construct could be providing polymorphic labels and label inferenc-
ing [Myers et al. ; Simonet 2003]. We believe that our approach can be extended to allow
such labels. For instance, in our example in Section 6, the piece of code that is executed
by Dr. Bob is common to all the doctors, and if we were to allow labels that could be
instantiated at run-time, the code could be reused.
Almeida Matos et al. [Matos and Boudol 2005] propose a flow construct that can dy-
namically introduce flows in a portion of the program. The flow, however, is local to the
block of code for which it has been defined. One difference is that the programmer can
arbitrarily introduce the flows irrespective of the context, whereas in our approach only
authorized principals can add the flows. Moreover, the new flows could be visible only to
authorized principals. Almeida Matos et al. prove the non-disclosure policy, which states
that at each step of execution, the program satisfies the noninterference property with re-
spect to the flow policy that holds for that step. In the absence of declassification, our
approach proves the same property. However, when there are declassifying updates, the
program terminates and no guarantees are given regarding the noninterference. In this case
the noninterference theorem proves noninterference until conditions, proposed by Chong
et al. [Chong and Myers 2004].
10. CONCLUSION
We have identified shortcomings in the recently proposed security-typed language
Rx [Swamy et al. 2006]. To address these problems, we have proposed a new security-
typed language, RTI, given static type-checking rules and dynamic execution semantics
for RTI, and proved noninterference until declassification for RTI.
In comparison to Rx, RTI more fully embraces the trust-management philosophy to-
wards authority and delegation. RTI adopts a writers-oriented approach for integrity poli-
cies. This gives role owners the autonomy they need to manage their role definitions with-
out outside interference. RTI protects individual policy statements that define aspects of a
role, rather than protecting an entire role as a single unit. This means that the membership
of the roles can be kept more private. For example, in RTI a member of a role is not neces-
sarily entitled to learn all the other members of that role, or to see all the statements used
to define that role. Finally, we also proposed an idiom for security labels that will assist
programmers in defining consistent labellings for policy statements and variables.
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Appendix
Following [Swamy et al. 2006] we use the proof technique due to Pottier and Simonet [Pot-
tier and Simonet 2003], in which a pair of executions of an RTI program is represented
within the syntax, given in figure 8, of an slightly extended form of the language itself,
called RTI2. Section A of the appendix introduces the RTI2 language, syntax and se-
mantics and we prove the noninterference property for confidentiality in section B of the
appendix. Therefore, in the rest of the appendix, we only consider the confidentiality part
of the labels, `, bounds, b, and pc.
A. RTI2
A.1 RTI2 Syntax
The first slight extension is that the try statements are labeled not only with a set of invariant
constraints Q, but also with a label pc that represents the pc label used to check the try.
RTI expressions E ::= true | false |x | v |E ⊕ E
RTI2 expressions E ::= E| v |E ⊕ E | 〈E||E〉
RTI statements S ::= skip |S;S | try(Q,pc)S |x := E
| while (E)S | if (E)S S
| if (〈q, b〉)S S | update ∆
RTI2 statements S ::= skip |  S||S  |S;S
| if (E)S S |x := E | try(Q,pc)S
| if (〈q, b〉)S S | update ∆
Fig. 8. Syntax of RTI2.
The syntactic elements that belong to RTI2 are denoted in the sans serif font (E,S),
while those in RTI are denoted by their italic counterparts (E,S). The expression E in the
RTI2 syntax can be a pair 〈E1||E2〉, and the statement S can be the pair 〈S1||S2〉. E1 and
S1 represent expression and statement in the first execution, likewise E2 and S2 represent
expression and statement in the second execution.
A.2 Static Semantics for RTI2
Ω ` v : tCL (T-LIT)
Ω.Γ(x) = tCL
Ω ` x : tCL
(T-VAR)
Ω ` E1 : tCL1 Ω ` E2 : tCL2
Ω ` E1 ⊕ E2 : tCL1unionsqCL2
(T-PLUS)
ρ ∈ ρH
Ω ` E1 : tCL Ω ` E2 : tCL
Ω ` E1 ‖ E2 : tCLunionsqρ
(T-EBR)
Ω ` x : tCL1 Ω ` E : tCL2 Ω.Φ ∈ {·, ∗}
Ω.Q ` CL2 v CL1 Ω.Q ` Ω.pc v CL1
Ω ` x := E : CL1 cmd
(T-Assign)
Ω.Φ ∈ {·, ∗} Ω ` S1 : CB1 cmd Ω ` S2 : CB2 cmd
Ω ` S1;S2 : (CB1 u CB2) cmd
(T-Seq)
ρ ∈ ρH pc′ = pc unionsq ρ
Γ; pc′;Q; Φ ` S1 : CB1 cmd Γ; pc′;Q; Φ ` S2 : CB2 cmd
Γ; pc;Q; Φ ` S1||S2 : CB1 u CB2 cmd
(T-SBR)
Γ; pc; ∅; try ` S : CB cmd
Γ; pc; ∅; · ` tryQ′,pcS : CB cmd
(T-Try)
Φ = try ⇒ Φ′ = try Φ ∈ {·, ∗} ⇒ Φ′ = ∗
Γ;cpc;Q ∪ {q}; Φ′ ` S1 : CB1 cmd q ∈ Q′
Γ;cpc;Q; Φ′ ` S2 : CB2 cmd CB = CB1 u CB2cpc = pc unionsq (unionsq{ρ1 | ∅ ` ρ1 v CB})
Γ; pc;Q; Φ ` if(〈q,CB〉) S1 S2 : CB cmd
(T-IfQ)
Γ; pc;Q; try ` ∆ : polCB
Γ; pc;Q; try ` update(∆) : CB cmd
(T-Up)
Γ; pc;Q; Φ ` E : tCL
Γ; pc unionsq CL;Q; Φ ` S1 : CB1 cmd Γ; pc unionsq CL;Q; Φ ` S2 : CB2 cmd
Γ; pc;Q; Φ ` if(E) S1 S2 : CB1 u CB2 cmd
(T-IfE)
Ω.Φ ∈ {·, ∗} Γ; pc;Q; Φ ` E : tCL Γ; pc unionsq CL;Q; Φ ` S : CB cmd
Γ; pc;Q; Φ ` while (E)S : CB cmd
(T-Whl)
Fig. 9. Static semantics of RTI2
RTI2 typing judgments given in figure 9 are identical to the RTI typing judgments, but for
the fact that they additionally handle bracketed expressions and statements. The bracketed
RTI2 Configuration:
policy Π ::=  Π1||Π2 
values v ::= v|  v1||v2 
memory M ::= {(x1, v1), . . . , (xn, vn)}
one snapshot Ψ∗ ::= .|(S)
snapshot Ψ ::= Ψ∗|  Ψ∗1||Ψ∗2 
configuration C ::= Π; M; Ψ
Values bvci:
bvc0 = v bvci = v b v1||v2 ci = vi
Policy bΠci:
bΠc0 = bΠc1 ∩ bΠc2 b∅ci = ∅
b Π1||Π2 c1 = Π1 b Π1||Π2 c2 = Π2
Memory bMci:
bMc0 = M b∅ci = ∅ b{(x, v)} ∪M}ci = {(x, v)} ∪ bMci
b{(x, v1||v2 )} ∪M}ci = {(x, vi)} ∪ bMci
Dynamic Snapshot bΨci:
bΨc0 = Ψ bΨ∗ci = Ψ∗ b Ψ∗1||Ψ∗2 ci = Ψ∗i
Configuration bCci:
b(Π,M,Ψ)ci = (bΠci, bMci, bΨci)
Fig. 10. RTI2 configurations and projections
expressions and statements are type-checked under a high pc. The high pc is calculated
using the high roles ρH(R,Π) as given in the figure 7. This ensures that even if the execu-
tion diverges in the expressions and statements, it does not contain any flows to observable
variables.
A.3 RTI2 Configurations and Observability
Since RTI2’s syntax consists of pairs of executions, the memory, the policy, and the ex-
ecution configuration must each accommodate the execution of the respective statements
within the pairs. As shown in figure 10, the structure of the configuration, C, incorporates
these generalized forms of memory, policy, and try snapshot. The memory, M, consists of
a single value for a variable x when both the executions agree on the value, or of a pair
of values, one for each execution. One of the values can also be empty when the mem-
ory location has not been initialized in the corresponding execution. On the other hand,
the policy, Π, is simply a pair of sets of labeled policy statements,  Π1||Π2 . The
snapshot, Ψ, is a pair of dynamic snapshots, each of which can optionally be empty(·).
Figure 10 also shows the result of projecting the pairs of values, policy, memory etc.
onto a single execution. This projection operator is used in the operational semantics when
the execution affects only one side of the execution.
Figure 11 extends the trace observability definitions in figure 7 to parallel executions.
We also extend the well-formedness definition to accommodate RTI2 configurations as
follows:
DEFINITION 13 WELL-FORMED CONFIGURATION C . A configuration C =
(Π,M,Ψ) is well-formed with respect to a context Ω, a set of roles R, and an i ∈ {0, 1, 2},
Policy Π |R :
Π |R = bΠc1 FR||bΠc2 FR 
Memory M |R,Π:
M |R,Π = bMc1 |R,bΠc1 ⊕ bMc2 |R,bΠc2 in which
M1 ⊕M2 = S
8><>:
(x,M1(x)) M1(x) = M2(x)
(x,M1(x)||M2(x)) M1(x) 6= M2(x)
(x,M1(x)||.) x ∈ dom(M1) \ dom(M2)
(x, .||M2(x)) x ∈ dom(M2) \ dom(M1)
Dynamic Snapshot Ψ |R,Π:
(S) |R,Π = (S)
 Ψ∗1||Ψ∗2 |R,Π = Ψ∗1 |R,Π||Ψ∗2 |R,Π 
Configuration C |R:
(Π,M,Ψ) |R = (Π |R,M |R,Π, .)
Fig. 11. Observability of RTI2 configurations
denoted by Ω |=R,i C, if and only if all the following are true:
dom(M) = dom(Ω.Γ) ∧ ∀x.Ω ` M(x) : Ω.Γ(x) (1)
∀〈q,CB〉 ∈ Ω.Q.bΠci CB ` q (2)
bC|Rc1 ≡ bC|Rc2 (3)
Clause (1) has been strengthened to say not only that the memory and the type system
have the same domain, but also that memory values are typed according (T-EBR) whenever
they are pairs. This rule requires that the label of value pairs must be high with respect toR.
As this is the only rule for typing value pairs, the effect is to prevent value pairs being in-
troduced if the locations are not high-security. The final difference is the addition of clause
(3), which requires that the pair of RTI2 configurations are observationally equivalent with
respect to the set of roles R belonging to the low observer.
A.4 Operational Semantics of RTI2
The operational semantics of RTI2 is given in figure 12. The execution rule is of the
form S /i C −→ S′ /i C′ The subscript i can be 0, 1, or 2 depending on whether the
operation is common to both the executions or not. If it is 0, then both the executions
take a step together and modify only low regions of the memory and policy. On the other
hand, when the execution reaches an expression where the two configurations diverge, the
configuration is split into two parallel configurations, and the execution rules are labeled 1
or 2. The lifting rules given in figure 13 give the semantics of the split.
A key element of the proof strategy is that the evaluation of statements and expressions
is split only in high contexts, where the evaluation effects are not observable to the attacker.
This enables us to show inductively that executions remain indistinguishable to the attacker,
even when the two parts of the execution are different. In (L-IFQ) for instance, because
the label of every variable or policy statement modified within S1 or S2 dominates CB ,
the premise ensures that none of those labels is low (with respect to R).
The premises of (L-IFQ) and (L-TR) bear discussion. No policy statements are needed
to show that ρ v CB (in (L-IFQ)) and that ρ v pc (in (L-TR)). This is because of how ρH
is defined: ρH(R,Π) = {ρ | ∀ρR ∈ R.Π FR 6` ρ v ρR}. Considering only the (L-IFQ)
case for the moment, when proving that some ρ ∈ ρH satisfies ρ v CB , there is no need
to use policy statements to show that there is a ρ′ such that ρ v ρ′ and ρ′ v CB . (For
bC.M(x)ci = v
x /i C −→ v /i C′
(E-VAR)
E1 /i C −→ E′1 /i C
E1 ⊕ E2 /i C −→ E′1 ⊕ E2 /i C
(E-ADL)
E2 /i C −→ E′2 /i C
v ⊕ E2 /i C −→ v ⊕ E′2 /i C
(E-ADR)
v = v1[[⊕]]v2
v1 ⊕ v2 /i C −→ v /i C
(E-ADV)
E /i C −→ E′ /i C
x := E /i C −→ x := E′ /i C
(E-ASE)
C′ = C[M = updloc2i (x, v, C.M)]
x := v /i C −→ skip /i C′
(E-ASV)
skip;S /i C −→ S /i C (E-SKP)
E /i C −→ E /i C
if (E) S1 S2 /i C −→ if (E) S1 S2 /i C
(E-IFE)
(v 6= 0⇒ j = 1)
(v = 0⇒ j = 2)
if (v) S1 S2 /i C −→ Sj /i C
(E-IFV) while (E)S /i C −→
if (E) {S; while (E)S} skip /i C (E-WHL)
S /i C −→ S′ /i C′
S;S /i C −→ S′;S /i C′
(E-SEQ)
Si /i C −→ S′i /i C′{i, j} = {1, 2} S′j = Sj
 S1||S2  /0 C −→  S′1||S′2  /0 C′
(E-BRK)
∀ρ ∈ ρH .bC.Πc0 CB ` ρ 6v CB
bC.Πc0 CB ` q ⇒ j = 1 bC.Πc0 CB 6` q ⇒ j = 2
if 〈q,CB〉S1 S2 /0 C −→ Sj /0 C
(E-IFQ-0)
i ∈ {1, 2}
(bC.Πci)CB ` q ⇒ j = 1
(bC.Πci)CB 6` q ⇒ j = 2
if 〈q,CB〉S1 S2 /i C −→ Sj /i C
(E-IFQ-i)
∃ρ ∈ ρL.bC.Πc0 unionsqR ` pc v ρ
bC.Ψc0 = . Ψ∗ = (try(Q,pc)S)
try(Q,pc)S /0 C −→ try(Q,pc)S /0 C[Ψ = Ψ∗]
(E-TR1-0)
i ∈ {1, 2} bC.Ψci = .
Ψ′ = updpsi2i (C.Ψ, (try(Q,pc)S))
try(Q,pc)S /i C −→ try(Q,pc)S /i C[Ψ = Ψ′]
(E-TR1-i)
bC.Ψci 6= . S /i C −→ S′ /i C′
try(Q,pc)S /i C −→ try(Q,pc)S′ /i C′
(E-TR2)
bC.Ψci 6= . Ψ′ = updpsi2i (C.Ψ, .)
try(Q,pc)skip /i C −→ skip /i C[Ψ = Ψ′]
(E-TR3)
Π′ = update2i (C.Π,∆) declass2(R, C.Π,Π′) = ∅ bC.Ψci = (try(Q,pc)S)
update ∆ /i C −→ skip /i C[Π = Π′]
(E-UP)
Where
declass2(R,Π1,Π2) = declass(R, bΠ1c1, bΠ2c1) ∪ declass(R, bΠ1c2, bΠ2c2)
updloc20(x, v,M) = M[(x, v)] updpsi
2
0(Ψ,Ψ
∗) = Ψ∗
updloc21(x, v,M) = M[(x, v||bM(x)c2 )] updpsi21(Ψ,Ψ∗) = Ψ∗||bΨc2 
updloc22(x, v,M) = M[(x, bM(x)c1||v)] updpsi22(Ψ,Ψ∗) = bΨc1||Ψ∗ 
update20(Π,∆) = update(bΠc1,∆)⊕ update(bΠc2,∆)
update21(Π,∆) = update(bΠc1,∆)⊕ bΠc2
update22(Π,∆) = bΠc1 ⊕ update(bΠc2,∆)
Fig. 12. Operational semantics of RTI2
 skip ‖ skip;S /0 C −→
S /0 C (L-SKIP)
if ( E1 ‖ E2 )S1 S2 /0 C −→
 if (E1)S1 S2 ‖ if (E2)S1 S2  /0 C (L-IFE)
v = bv1c1 + bv2c1 ‖ bv1c2 + bv2c2 
v1 + v2 /0 C −→ v /0 C
(L-ADD)
∃ρ ∈ ρH .∅ ` ρ v CB
if (〈q,CB〉)S1 S2 /0 C −→
 if (〈q,CB〉)S1 S2 ‖ if (〈q,CB〉)S1 S2  /0 C
(L-IFQ)
∃ρ ∈ ρH .∅ ` ρ v pc
try(Q,pc) S /0 C −→  try(Q,pc) S ‖ try(Q,pc) S  /0 C
(L-TR)
Fig. 13. Lifting rules for RTI2
instance, CB might be a meet of joins of roles, each of which includes ρ′.) In this case,
there is no need to consider ρ at all. This is because, by the way ρH is defined, ρ′ would
also satisfy ρ′ ∈ ρH ∧ ρ′ v CB and would therefore itself be a witness for the existential
in the premise of (L-IFQ), so the premise would be satisfied without need to show ρ v ρ′.
Essentially the same argument applies to the premise of (L-TR).
THEOREM 14 (SOUNDNESS). Given any RTI2 statement S and any RTI2 configuration
C, if bCc1 | R = bCc2 | R and S /i C −→ S′ /i C′, then (bCc1, bSc1) −→= (bC′c1, bS′c1)
and (bCc2, bSc2) −→= (bC′c2, bS′c2), in which−→= denotes zero or one step of standard
execution.
PROOF. The proof examines each rule in the operational semantics of RTI2 and verifies
that each of the projected configurations takes zero or one steps in the operational semantics
of RTI. When the RTI2 step is given by one of the statements (L-IFE), (L-IFQ), and (L-
TR), neither projection takes a step. For the other rules, when i = 0, both projections take
one step, as can be seen by inspection of the rules. Similarly, one can verify that when
i ∈ {1, 2}, one projection is unchanged and the other takes a corresponding step in the
standard semantics.
A maximal, declassification-free execution is an execution that cannot be extended or
cannot be extended without performing a policy update that moves some role from ρH to
ρL. Such configurations can be alternately referred to as stuck configurations(as mentioned
in the Pottier and Simonet’s paper). Our version of the stuck configuration lemma is as
follows:
LEMMA 15 (STUCK CONFIGURATIONS). Given any RTI2 configuration C and state-
ment S, if no declassification-free execution step can be performed on S /i C, then no
declassification-free execution step can be performed on (bCci, bSci) for either i ∈ {1, 2}.
PROOF. The proof consists in verifying that for each RTI2 statement and execution con-
figuration, if no operational semantics rule can be applied to advance the execution, then
neither of the RTI executions can take an execution step. Therefore the proof is by induc-
tion on structure of S:
—Case S = skip. S cannot be stuck.
—Case S = S||S . Since we assume that S is stuck, i.e. neither (E-BRK) nor (L-
SKIP) can be applied to S. From the premises of (E-BRK) we can infer that neither
configurations can take one step of execution.
—Case S = S;S. Since we assume that S is stuck, neither (E-SEQ) nor (R-SEQ) can be
applied. From the induction hypothesis on the premises of (E-SEQ) and (R-SEQ), we
can infer that no execution step can be performed on (bCci, bSci) for either i ∈ {1, 2}.
—Case S = if (E)S S, S = while (E)S. If E is of the form E1||E2  or v, it cannot
be stuck, since (L-IFE) can be applied to it. If E is of the form E and it is stuck, it means
that (E-IFE) cannot be applied to it, which means that one of the variables in E was not
initialized in either bCc1 or bCc2.
—Case S = x := E. Since we assume that S is stuck, (E-ASE) cannot be applied. From
the premises we can infer that E cannot take another execution step. This is possible
only if (E-ADL), (E-ADR) and (E-ADV) cannot be applied. These executions cannot
be applied only if (E-VAR) cannot be applied, i.e. some variable in E is not initialized
in both the executions. This will ensure that both the RTI executions are stuck too.
—Case S = try(Q,pc) S1. If the rules (E-TR1-0), (E-TR3) or (L-TR) can be applied, S
cannot be stuck. The only case in which S is stuck is when (E-TR2) needs to be applied.
From the premise of (E-TR2) we infer that S1 is stuck. By applying the induction hy-
pothesis, we get that both the RTI execution configurations that constitute S1 are stuck;
consequently those that constitute S are also stuck.
—Case S = if 〈q,CB〉S1 S2. S cannot be stuck since one of (E-IFQ-0) and (L-IFQ) can
be applied to it.
—Case S = update∆. This statement cannot be stuck.
THEOREM 16 (COMPLETENESS). Given any RTI program statement S and two con-
figurations E1 and E2 such that E1 |R = E2 |R, there exists an RTI2 configuration C such
that bCci = Ei for i ∈ {1, 2}. Furthermore, if there are maximal, finite, declassification-
free executions (E1, S) −→∗ (E ′1, S′) and (E2, S) −→∗ (E ′2, S′′) then there exists a max-
imal, finite, declassification-free execution S /i C −→∗ S /i C′ such that bC′ci = Ei for
i ∈ {1, 2}.
PROOF. The proof of the first statement is by construction. Given two RTI configura-
tions E1 and E2 such that E1 |R = E2 |R, we can construct an RTI2 configuration C, such
that C.Π = E1.Π||E2.Π , C.M = E1.M ⊕ E2.M and C.Ψ = E1.Ψ||E2.Ψ . This
C satisfies our requirement that bCci = Ei for i ∈ {1, 2}.
For the second part, we begin by showing that the RTI2 semantics cannot take infinitely
many steps without performing a step that corresponds to an RTI step. When a non-split
RTI2 statement transits to a split statement, it does so via one of the lifting rules, (L-IFE),
(L-IFQ), and (L-TR), which clearly cannot be repeated. Non-split expressions become
split expression only in (E-VAR), in which a variable can be replaced by a split value from
memory. Clearly this corresponds to one memory look-up step in each of the two RTI
executions. When a non-split RTI2 statement or expression is executed one step, without
transiting to a split statement or expression, and these rules are essentially the same in RTI2
as they are in RTI, this step corresponds directly to one step in each of the RTI executions.
Split RTI2 statements are handled by (E-BRK) and by (L-SKIP). The premise of (E-BRK)
requires that one of the two RTI executions proceeds one step, so we are done. (L-SKIP)
corresponds to a step being taken in both RTI executions.
The number of times (L-ADD) can be applied is bounded by the depth of the expression,
as each application raises the split one level closer to the root of the expression. Each
of the other rules whereby a split expression can transit to a split expression involve the
application of an operator, and hence corresponds to a step in the RTI executions. This
covers all cases, concluding the argument.
The argument for the rest of the second part is as follows. Because the RTI operational
semantics is deterministic and the RTI2 semantics is sound, any RTI2 execution sequence
that can be found will correspond to initial sub-sequences of the given RTI sequences.
And, as argued above, the RTI2 execution sequence cannot take an unbounded number of
steps without performing a step that corresponds to a step in at least one of the given RTI
executions. So the only way for the RTI2 execution to fail to correspond to the pair of RTI
executions would be for it to get stuck in the sense that no declassification-free step can be
performed on it, while this does not occur in the each of the RTI executions. However this
possibility is ruled out by Lemma 15.
B. PROVING NONINTERFERENCE
B.1 Augmented Typing Judgments
The augmented typing judgments that can be shown by using rules given in figure 14 are
used by the subject reduction theorem. These judgments are shown below to be preserved
by execution steps. They capture an induction hypothesis that enables one to show induc-
tively that the two parts of an RTI2 configuration remain indistinguishable to the adversary
as execution proceeds. Note that augmented types drop the command types. These were
needed in the standard judgments because of the need to infer appropriate bounds on policy
statements to use in evaluating queries. The information-flow due to control dependencies
is reasoned about by in the non-interference result entirely through the use of the pc. To
support doing so, the type rule (T-IfQ) for RTI2 raises the pc to reflect potential control
dependence on policy statements used to evaluate the query. This was not necessary in
RTI, where this form of information flow was controlled by using command types.
B.2 Maintaining Observational Equivalence
Together, the results in this section show that the two RTI executions modeled by a sin-
gle RTI2 execution remain indistinguishable to the adversary when a single step is taken.
Lemma 17 shows this in high contexts and Lemma 19 shows it in low contexts.
LEMMA 17 (OBSERVATIONAL EQUIVALANCE IN HIGH CONTEXTS). Suppose for a
program S and a configuration C such that Ω `C,i,R S and S /i C −→ S′ /i C′. It follows
that if ∀ρ ∈ R . (bC.Πci |R 6` Ω.pc v ρ) then C |R = C′ |R.
PROOF. The proof is by induction on the structure of the derivation of the single step.
When C = C′, the lemma holds trivially. The only observable components of a configura-
tion C are C.M and C.Π. We consider memory and policy effects separately.
Let us first consider memory effects. All updates to memory occur through the function
updloc2i . Applications of this function appear in the premise of (E-ASV).
In this case, only the memory changes, not the policy. The assignment must be type-
checked by using (T-A1) or (T-A2) preceded in either case by (T-Assign), the premise of
Ω |=R,i C bC.Ψci = · ∃CB .Ω ` S : CB cmd
Ω `C,i,R S
(T-A1)
Ω[Q = Q′] |=R,i C bC.Ψci = (try(Q,pc)S1)
(S = try(Q,pc)S2 ⇒ S′ = S2)
(S 6= try(Q,pc)S2 ⇒ S′ = S)
Q′ ⊆ Q Ω.Q ⊆ Q ∀〈q,CB ′〉 ∈ Q′.bC.Πci  b′ ` q
Ω.pc = pc ∃CB .Ω[Q = Q′][Φ = try] ` S′ : CB cmd
Ω `C,i,R S
(T-A2)
C.Ψ = Ψ∗1||Ψ∗2  ∃ρ ∈ ρH .pc′ = pc unionsq ρ
∀i ∈ {1, 2}.Ω[pc = pc′] `C,i,R Si
Ω `C,0,R S1||S2 
(T-A3)
Ω `C,i,R try(Q,pc)S ∃CB .Ω ` S′ : CB cmd
Ω `C,i,R try(Q,pc)S;S′
(T-A4)
Fig. 14. Augmented typing judgment
which gives us Ω′.Q ` Ω′.pc v lab(Ω′.Γ(x)) in which Ω′.pc = Ω.pc and Ω′.Γ = Ω.Γ.
By Lemma 11 and the premise of (T-A2), ∀〈q,CB ′〉 ∈ Q′.bC.Πci CB ′ ` q, it follows that
bC.Πci |R ` Ω.pc v lab(Ω.Γ(x)).
Suppose for contradiction that C.M | R,C.Π 6= C′.M | R,C.Π. Since C.Π = C′.Π, for the
change to be observable, we must have that x ∈ dom(C.M | R,C.Π). Since the memory
update does not change the domain, we have dom(C.M |R,C.Π) = dom(C′.M |R,C.Π). From
the definition of M |R,Π, C.M |R,C.Π 6= C′.M |R,C.Π is possible only if there exists ρ ∈ R
such that bC.Πci | R ` lab(Ω.Γ(x)) v ρ. However, if this were the case, it would mean
that bC.Πci |R ` Ω.pc v ρ for some ρ ∈ R, which contradicts the assumption.
All policy updates occur in the rule (E-UP), where the function update2i is used. If
a statement that is added or removed is observable at level R, its label is dominated by
some ρ ∈ R. However, the label of such a statement must dominate Ω.pc. So it follows
that some ρ ∈ R dominates Ω.pc, which contradicts the hypothesis. Thus, no observable
policy effect can occur.
COROLLARY 18. If S1 ‖ S2  /0 C −→  S′1 ‖ S′2  /0 C′ and Ω `C,0,R
S1 ‖ S2  then C |R = C′ |R
PROOF. The proof follows from lemma 17, the premise of (T-SBR) and (T-A3) which
requires S1 and S2 to be checked under a high pc.
LEMMA 19. If S /0 C −→ S′ /0 C′, then if Ω `C,0,R S, then bC′c1 |R = bC′c2 |R
PROOF. The proof of this lemma proceeds similar to that of lemma 17. From the hy-
pothesis we know that Ω `C,0,R S, and therefore bCc1 | R = bCc2 | R. For any step in
the execution, C changes only if either the memory changes or if the policy changes or
both. Bracketed expressions and statements type-check only under high pc as given by the
premises of (T-EBR) and (T-SBR). Since the memory or policy diverges only when brack-
eted expressions and statements are executed, the observable part of the configuration is
the same and hence the proof.
B.3 Subject Reduction
This section proves the central theorem from which noninterference follows by a simple
induction. This subject reduction theorem shows that augmented well typing is preserved
by execution steps. Augmented well typing requires that the configuration is well formed,
and this requires that the two RTI executions modeled by a single RTI2 execution have
configurations that are indistinguishable to the adversary.
THEOREM 20 (SUBJECT REDUCTION). Assume we are given a program S and a con-
figuration C such that S /i C −→ S′ /i C′. Given any context Ω, any a set of roles R, any
i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, and any confidentiality label CL or confidentiality bound CB , if Ω `C,i,R S
and (i = 0 or ∃ρ ∈ ρH .ρ v Ω.pc), then Ω `C′,i,R S′. Similarly, if E /i C −→ E′ /i C,
Ω |=R,i C, and Ω ` E : tCL, then Ω ` E′ : tCL.
PROOF. The proof is by induction on the structure of the derivations of S /i C −→
S′ /i C′ and E /i C −→ E′ /i C.
(E-VAR): By assumption Ω ` x : tCL and by clause (1) of Ω |=R,i C, Ω ` M(x) : Ω.Γ(x).
By the premise of (E-VAR), bM(x)ci = v. When i = 0, we obtain Ω ` v : tCL imme-
diately, as required. When i ∈ {1, 2}, the result follows by the fact that (T-EBR) must be
used to show Ω ` v : tCL, the premises of which give us Ω ` bM(x)ci : tCL.
(E-ADL, E-ADR, E-ADV): Trivial. Can be proved using the hypothesis, the rules’
premises, and the rule (T-PLUS).
(E-ASE, E-SKIP): Trivial.
(E-ASV): To prove Ω `C′,i,R skip we just need to show that Ω |=R,i C′. The rest of
the proof is trivial. The first clause of Ω |=R,i C′ follows from the assumption that
Ω `C,i,R x := v, which can be shown only by using (T-A1) or (T-A2), both of which
require that Ω |=R,i C. This can now be used to prove Ω ` v : Ω.Γ(x) as required for
clause (1). Clause (2) is trivially satisfied since updloc does not change Π. When i = 0,
clause (3) follows from Lemma 19. When i 6= 0, it follows from Corollary 18.
(E-SEQ): The proof of this case can be divided into several cases based on the judgment
used for the derivation of Ω `C,i,R S;S.
—Case (T-A1): Since (T-A1) is used, bC.Ψci = ·. The proof can again be split into two
cases: (i) If bC′.Ψci = ·, then (T-A1) can be applied again by using Ω ` S′ : CB1 cmd
and Ω |=R,i C′ from the induction hypothesis. We also get Ω ` S : CB2 cmd from the
premise of (T-A1) and using (T-Seq), where CB = CB1 u CB2. (ii) If bC′.Ψci 6= ·,
then we must prove Ω `C′,i,R S′;S by using (T-A4). The first premise of (T-A4) is
obtained from the induction hypothesis and the second premise is obtained from the
proof of Ω ` S, S and hence the result.
—Case (T-A2): This means that the pair of statements is in the body of the try block and
this is precluded by our static semantics.
—Case (T-A3): Since a sequence of statements cannot be a statement pair, this case is not
possible.
—Case (T-A4): In this case, S has the form try(Q,pc)S1 and the three premises of (T-A4)
are Ω `C,i,R try(Q,pc)S1, Ω ` S : CB2 cmd, and CB = CB1 u CB2. There are now
three cases: (i) If bC.Ψci = ·, then (E-TR1-0) or (E-TR1-i) applies, and so bC′.Ψci 6= ·.
From the first premise of (T-A4) shown above and the induction hypothesis, we obtain
Ω `C′,i,R try(Q,pc)S′1. Combining this with the second premise of (T-A4) shown above
and using (T-A4), we obtain the desired result. (ii) If bC.Ψci 6= · and bC′.Ψci 6= ·,
(E-TR2) applies and we proceed as in case (i). (iii) If bC.Ψci 6= · and bC′.Ψci = ·,
(E-TR3) applies and S′ = skip. Ω `C,i,R skip follows from the induction hypothesis.
This can be proved only by using (T-A1), from the premises of which we get Ω |=R,i C′
and Ω ` skip : CB1 cmd. By using the latter and the second premise of (T-A4) shown
above in (T-Seq), we obtain Ω ` skip;S : CB cmd. By using this, Ω |=R,i C′, and the
case assumption, we obtain the desired result.
(E-IFE, E-IFV, E-WHL): Trivial.
(E-IFQ-0, E-IFQ-i): For i ∈ {0, 1, 2} the derivation of Ω `C,i,R if 〈q,CL〉S1 S2 must
end with an application of either (T-A1) or (T-A2).
In either case, from the assumption that the if statement type-checks, we have that both
legs type-check, so the induction obligation follows immediately.
(E-TR1-0): The only difference between Ω `C,i,R try(Q,pc)S and Ω `C′,i,R try(Q,pc)S
is the fact that C.Ψ = · and C.Ψ′ 6= ·. (T-A1) is used to prove the first judgment, while
(T-A2) should be used to prove the second. The premises of (T-A2) follow trivially from
those of (T-A1).
(E-TR1-i): The proof of this case is similar to that of (E-TR1-0).
(E-TR2, E-TR3): Trivial
(E-UP): Showing that Ω `C,i,R skip can be done only by using (T-A2). For this, we
will take Q′ = ∅ in the premise of (T-A2). Since the skip statement type checks with
any Ω, the non-trivial part is showing that Ω[Q = ∅] |=R,i C′. Clauses (1) and (2) are
straightforward. For clause (3), it suffices to show that bC′|Rc1 = bC′|Rc2. Ω |=R,i C
gives us bC|Rc1 = bC|Rc2. When i = 0, the result follows from Lemma 19. When i 6= 0,
the result follows from Corollary 18.
(R-SEQ): Trivial
(E-BRK): If i and j could be either 1 or 2, the derivation of Ω `C,0,R S1||S2  ends
in (T-A3), from the premises of which we get S′j = Sj and bC′cj = bCcj . Form the
induction hypothesis we can prove Ω `bC′ci,0,R S′i. Using (T-A3) again we can prove
Ω `C,0,R S′1||S′2 .
(L-IFE): Fix any Ω satisfying Ω `C,0,R if ( E1 ‖E2 ) S1 S2. The obligation is to
show that Ω `C,0,R if (E1) S1 S2 ‖ if (E2) S1 S2 . This can be shown by using
(T-A3), a premise of which is that there exists a ρ ∈ ρH such that for each i ∈ {1, 2},
Ω[pc = pˆc] `C,i,R if (Ei) S1 S2 (12)
in which pˆc = Ω.pc unionsq ρ.
Examining the assumption that Ω `C,0,R if ( E1 ‖E2 ) S1 S2, the proof of this
must end with an application of either (T-A1) or (T-A2), depending on whether or not the
statement is inside a transaction. This last step must be preceded by a step using (T-IfE)
to show Ω ` if ( E1 ‖ E2 ) S1 S2 : CB cmd, which requires using (T-EBR) to
show Ω ` E1 ‖E2 :CB ′′, where there exist CB ′ and ρ′ such that CB ′′ = CB ′ unionsq ρ′,
ρ′ ∈ ρH , and Ω ` E1 :CB ′ and Ω ` E2 :CB ′. The use of (T-IfE) also requires that the
following premises can be shown: Ω[pc = pc′′] ` Si :CB i cmd for i ∈ {1, 2}, in which
pc′′ = Ω.pc unionsq CB ′′ and CB = CB1 u CB2.
From these, we now begin to meet our obligation. Observe that pc′′ = Ω.pcunionsqρ′unionsqCB ′.
From Ω ` E1 :CB ′, and Ω[pc = pc′′] ` Si :CLi cmd for i ∈ {1, 2}, (T-IfE) now gives
us Ω[pc = Ω.pc unionsq ρ′] ` if (E1) S1 S2 : CB cmd. We obtain Ω[pc = Ω.pc unionsq ρ′] `
if (E2) S1 S2 :CB cmd similarly. We now use (T-A1) or (T-A2), depending on whether
or not the statement is inside a transaction, to complete the proof of (12), with the required
value of ρ given by ρ′. (Notice that in the case that (T-A2) is used, the same value of Q′
satisfies the respective premises as was used in the application of (T-A2) that concludes the
proof of the assumption.)
(L-SKIP,L-ADD): Trivial.
(L-IFQ): The hypothesis that Ω `C,0,R if (〈q,CB〉) S1 S2 can be shown by using (T-A1)
when the statements is outside any try statement and by using (T-A2) when it inside a try.
In each case, we show how to meet the proof obligation, Ω `C,0,R if (〈q,CB〉)S1 S2 ‖
if (〈q,CB〉)S1 S2 , by using (T-A3).
Consider the (T-A1) case first. The following two premises of (T-A1) are known to
be met: Ω |=R,0 C and Ω ` if (〈q,CB〉) S1 S2 : CB cmd. The latter of these can be
shown only by using (T-IfQ), which ensures that the two legs of the conditional can be
type checked with the pc value given by p̂c = pc unionsq (unionsq{ρ1 | ∅ ` ρ1 v CB}. Note that the
premise of (L-IFQ) guarantees that ∃ρ ∈ ρH .∅ ` ρ v CB , so p̂c satisfies ∃ρ′ ∈ ρH .ρ′ v
p̂c. Fix such a ρ′.
We will use (T-A1) to satisfy the following premise of (T-A3) so as to meet the obliga-
tion: ∀i ∈ {1, 2}.Ω[pc = pc′] `C,i,R if (〈q,CB〉)S1 S2 in which pc′ = pc unionsq ρ for some
ρ ∈ ρH . We can take this ρ to be the ρ′ fixed in the previous paragraph. Thus, when using
(T-IfQ) to satisfy the premise of (T-A1), the same p̂c can be used. Each application of
(T-A1) requires Ω |=R,i C for the respective i ∈ {1, 2}. Clauses (1) and (3) follow imme-
diately from Ω |=R,0 C. Clause (2) also follows from this because at least as many policy
statements are available to prove bΠci  CB ` q when i ∈ {1, 2} as when i = 0. Because
C is unchanged by (L-IFQ), the other premise of (T-A1) follow trivially from the case as-
sumption that (T-A1) is used to prove the hypothesis. Thus we can meet the obligation in
this case.
The (T-A2) case is similar. In it (T-A2) is used to satisfy the premise of (T-A3).
(L-TR): Trivial, using (T-A3) and then (T-A1) to prove the premises.
